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INTRODUCTION

hen the Supreme Court upheld extended copyright terms
in Eldred v. Ascroft,' many Internet activists called for renewed political action in the form of appeals to Congress
or even a campaign to amend the Constitution. But others suggested a very different course: They argued that it would be wiser
to forgo institutions controlled by the powers of the past, and to return instead to the keyboard to write the next generation of "lawbusting" code. In the words of one observer, "tech people are
probably better off spending their energy writing code than being
part of the political process" because "[t]hat's where their competitive advantage lies."2
The idea that computer code may be emerging as a meaningful
instrument of political will remains one of the most evocative and
poorly understood propositions in the study of law and technology.
The prominent effects of computer code have made it difficult to
ignore the fact that code can be used to produce regulatory effects
1123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).

2

Declan McCullagh, Geeks in government: A good idea?, at http://news.com.com/
2010-1071-949275.html (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (quoting Sonia Arrison of the Pacific Research Institute).
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similar to laws. Hence, the popularity of Professor Lawrence Lessig's idea that (for computer users at least) "code is law."3
But what this really means remains extremely vague. The subject
remains the focus of grand speculation, ranging from claims that
computer code will arise as a kind of utopian sovereign to improve
on perceived failures of state regulation,' to concerns that code
may be used to negate basic freedoms,5 and, of course, the claim
that nothing of legal novelty has happened, or perhaps ever will
happen.6
Most problematically, none of these understandings of code and
law explains a central issue: compliance. Specifically, they do not
explain the shifting patterns of legal compliance in the 2000s. Explosions of non-compliance in areas such as copyright, pornography, financial fraud, and prescription drugs fuel the sense of a legal
breakdown, yet the vast majority of laws remains unaffected. The
mixed compliance pattern finds little explanation in the concept
that "code is law" or in notions that technological self-help can offer a substitute for legal systems
3

See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 89 (1999).
'These claims are described and discussed in Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 Green Bag 2d 171, 172-73 (2000). See also Tom W. Bell, Escape from
Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive
Works, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2001) (arguing that the efficacy of technological selfhelp should allow voluntary exit from the copyright regime); Kenneth W. Dam, SelfHelp in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1999) (arguing that technological
self-help will play a positive role in the growth of electronic commerce).
'See Lessig, supra note 3, at 233.
6See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace
Violates Federal Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1569 (1999) (arguing that Internet gambling
should be regulated as usual); Edward A. Morse, State Taxation of Internet Commerce: Something New Under the Sun?, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1113 (1997) (arguing
that issues of state taxation of Internet-based commerce are familiar); James B. Speta,
Internet Theology, 2 Green Bag 2d 227 (1999) (arguing that Internet publication does
not justify major changes to the First Amendment regime). One could attribute this
view to Jack Goldsmith, though in his view, unfairly. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1201 (1998).
'E.g., Lessig, supra note 3; Bell, supra note 4. Also, the scholarship examining the
metaphors used for Internet conduct does not explain compliance patterns. See, e.g.,
Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 90
Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) (noting the persistence of the space metaphor); Orin
S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2003)
(arguing that technological perspectives decide Internet cases); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1163 (1999) (arguing that analysis.
should focus on application development); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feu-
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This Article will propose a new and concrete way to understand
the relationship between code and compliance with law. I propose
to study the design of code as an aspect of interest group behavior:
as simply one of several mechanisms that groups use to minimize
legal costs. Code design, in other words, can be usefully studied as
an alternative to lobbying campaigns, tax avoidance, or any other
approach that a group might use to seek legal advantage. The approach aims to separate two different aspects of code's relationship
with law. The first is Lessig's concept of a regulatory mechanism:
that computer code can substitute for law or other forms of regulation. The second aspect is as an anti-regulatory mechanism: a tool
to minimize the costs of law that certain groups will use to their advantage.
The code designer, I suggest, redesigns behavior for legal advantage. The programmer is not unlike the tax lawyer, exploiting differences between stated goals of the law, and its legal or practical
limits. He targets specific weaknesses in legal regimes, and has no
means to rewrite laws in general. Therefore, I argue that the longterm significance of the programmer's methods for the legal system
can be described in a fairly straightforward fashion. At its greatest
extent, the design of code may provide a new option for influencing specific laws. It will be of the greatest importance to individuals
or large, disorganized groups poorly equipped to take advantage of
existing means of political influence. And as such, the code option
may mean some change in the relative power of interest groups, as
it makes organization slightly less important.
The gains to diffuse groups may seem to be a positive development. But there is a darker side. Code design, as a means of avoiding laws, serves as a particularly useful device for exploiting the internal dynamics of regulated groups. It is, as this Article will show,
a useful way for the computer-savvy to avoid legal burdens while
continuing to enjoy the benefits of an ordered society, thanks to
the continued compliance of the technophobic.
In short, increasing use of code to minimize the burden of laws
has interesting and complicated effects for both the legal system
and political system that have been misunderstood. The effects are
dal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1207
(2002) (comparing metaphors of the frontier with cyberspace).
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categorically different from the fundamental challenge to the legal
system that some had imagined, and analytically distinct from the
concept that code is a form of regulation.
The important case of peer-to-peer ("P2P") filesharing, explored
in depth in this Article, illustrates the possibility of using code design as an alternative mechanism of interest group behavior. These
ingenious programs, bearing names like "KaZaA" and "BearShare," make it free and easy to trade digital content (usually
copyrighted songs) with millions of new-found friends.
P2P filesharing represents the most ambitious effort to undermine an existing legal system using computer code. The significance of P2P for copyright is substantial. The efforts of P2P programmers have provided computer-savvy music listeners with a
continuing reduction in the costs of the copyright system, comparable to a temporary repeal of copyright laws for computer geeks.
P2P underlines the reality of code design as an alternative mechanism of interest group behavior.
But P2P filesharing also makes the limits of this alternative
mechanism clear. The efficacy of P2P filesharing depends on two
powerful and often unrecognized weaknesses of the copyright regime: the law's dependence on a gatekeeper enforcement mechanism and the severe lack of normative support among the regulated. Successful P2P networks relegate the law to an exercise in
primary enforcement against a multitude of end-users.
P2P's success may depend on a unique collective action dynamic
among music consumers that stems from the nature of copyrighted
works. The works available on peer networks are generally nonrivalrous goods.8 As a result, the sub-group of P2P users, young and
computer-savvy,9 can take advantage of the continued compliance
of regular consumers. The mass of regular users pay for the works,
8That

is to say, one individual's consumption does not diminish another user's value

of the product. I emphasize this characteristic because some scholars have suggested
that songs on peer networks display rivalrous features. See Ramayya Krishnan et al.,
The Economics of Peer-To-Peer Networks at 5 (Aug. 2002 draft), available at
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-mds/ (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
' According to an Ipsos-Reid study, those who use peer filesharing networks are
predominantly between the ages of twelve and twenty-four. See Robyn Greenspan,
Making Money on Free Music, at http://www.internetnews.com/stats/article.php/
1365161 (last visited May 12, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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thereby maintaining incentives for artists to create them, while the
P2P sub-group defects en masse, occupying the game-theorist's
version of utopia.
These weaknesses, however, represent unique problems for
copyright law and are not more generalized weaknesses of the legal
system. For that reason, the utility of P2P as a means of avoiding
law appears limited. Only a few regimes may contain other particularized enforcement weaknesses comparable to those of the copyright regime.
This Article's claims will rely on a model of compliance and interest group behavior with certain novel features. Namely, the focus is on the mechanisms through which groups influence law. It is
the goal of Part I of the Article to make the underlying model
clear.
Laws impose costs upon regulated groups. Those groups that
seek to minimize the costs of law face a fundamental choice between mechanisms of change and avoidance. Both mechanisms
have the effect of lowering the expected costs of law, but the similarities end there. Mechanisms of change (principally lobbying) decrease the sanction attached to certain conduct and tend to require
collective action. Mechanisms of avoidance, on the other hand, decrease the probability of detection and typically do not require that
groups act collectively, but depend on specific vulnerabilities in the
law.
This understanding, while not exhaustive, is descriptively useful
even in the simple form presented. It clarifies the link between
problems of compliance and group dynamics-the extent of organization of the regulated. It shows that changes in the costs of
mechanisms of legal influence can dramatically affect the function
of a given law.
Part I will conclude by explaining how the design of code can be
viewed as a mechanism of legal influence. It will argue that code is
used to reshape behavior to take advantage of loopholes and ambiguities in legal systems. As such, code is a mechanism of avoidance, displaying the properties of avoidance described in the
model.
Part II will demonstrate the unique vulnerabilities of copyright
laws and code's ability to exploit those weaknesses. Copyright enforcement has long relied on what Professor Reinier Kraakman
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first called a gatekeeper regime.1" In other words, the copyright regime has achieved its goals through enforcement against specialized intermediaries-those capable of distributing creative works
on a mass scale. Peer networks exploit that enforcement structure
by creating a distribution network that eliminates intermediaries.
While eliminating intermediaries presents a serious technical challenge, the goal is clear-to remove the enforcement efficiency of a
gatekeeper system, leaving primary enforcement against end-users
as the only option.
P2P networks also exploit an important ambiguity regarding the
ethics of home copying. Compliance with laws pertaining to the
theft of real property is facilitated in part by the status of clearly established norms. These norms help prevent certain forms of economic injury to copyright owners, like the stealing of books or CDs
from stores. Studies show that people are generally untroubled by
the non-commercial home copying of copyrighted content." P2P
applications are designed to look and feel more like noncommercial home copying than like breaking into a record store.
The design therefore successfully exploits the normative
distinction
12
"copying.
innocuous
and
"stealing"
illegal
between
Part III will demonstrate how P2P protocols have grown,
through several iterations, to specialize in exploiting copyright's
gatekeeper system. By its end, the P2P story suggests real limits on
network design's ability to influence law. Influencing the law in
such a manner requires, particular vulnerabilities in the law and a
group that lacks better options. The limits in generalizing the P2P
model to other areas of law demonstrate why the compliance chal-

10Reinier

H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-party Enforcement

Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 53-54 (1986).
" See Amanda Lenhart et al., The Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Downloading
Free Music: Internet music lovers don't think it's stealing 5 (Sept. 28, 2000), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=23 (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association); Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Copyright and
Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law 163 (Oct. 1989), at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/diskl/1989/8910_n.html (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
,2
Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms and the Emergence
of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 Va. L. Rev. 505 (2003) (arguing
that charismatic code creates an illusion of reciprocity that accounts for why people
contribute to a filesharing network).
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lenge is specific to certain classes of vulnerable laws, not a general
challenge to the legal system.
Part IV will conclude by studying the fit between P2P applications and music consumers as an interest group. A fascinating aspect of the peer filesharing story is the lack of coordination and organization that characterized its development. Developers bicker
and work independently, and etiquette among users must be engineered or, as Professor Lior Strahilevitz argues, induced with
"charismatic code."13 Despite the chaos, peer networks have managed to provide a subset of music listeners with a continuing reduction in the costs of copyright laws.
Such results from disorganized efforts are consistent with the
distinction between mechanisms of avoidance and of change. The
disorganization supports the claim that matters as an option for
groups whose inability to act collectively precludes better options.
Finally, the results may also reflect the current ability of P2P users to take advantage of the continued compliance of the majority
of the population. The copyright regime's subjects are divided by a
technological line between the computer-savvy and regular users.
Because consumption of copyrighted works is non-rivalrous, P2P
users may rely on regular users to pay for music and to provide incentives for its creation, free-riding on the results.
Analyzing code design as a mechanism of interest group behavior yields a nuanced picture. It departs from the grandiose predictions that dominate discussion in this area. As with the onset of
lobbying, impact litigation, or sophisticated tax evasion, the rise of
copyright evasion is best understood as a change in power dynamics among and within regulated groups.
I. A

THEORY OF CODE, CHANGE, AND AVOIDANCE

The design of anti-regulatory code is best analyzed as one of
many mechanisms that interest groups might use to influence the
effects of law. Implicit in this argument is a set of assumptions and
arguments that Part I seeks to clarify.

3 See

id.
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A. Reactions to Law in General Theories of Regulation
John Austin, lecturing on jurisprudence in the early 1800s,
sought to separate law, the "appropriate matter of jurisprudence,"
from morals, religious scruples, and other distractions." Two hundred years later, positive legal scholarship has come full circle.
Rather than focusing on separating law from norms or ethics, it has
pushed instead toward understanding law as part of more general
theories of regulation.15 Led by the law and society movement and
Robert Ellickson's book, Order Without Law, theorists routinely
study the regulatory effects of law, group rules, social norms, and
even the regulatory potential of code. 6 Such scholarship reflects an
effort to understand all the "forces" of regulation that might be
acting on an individual, reasoning that understanding the study of
law alone gives an incomplete picture. Robert Ellickson even gave
the study of law in isolation a pejorative label: "legal centralis[m].""7
Based on this work, the Internet law writers of the 1990s added
the idea that the design of computer code could be understood as
an alternative means of regulation, leading to the catchphrase
"Code is Law."'" The idea is that programmers make choices that
constrain online capability, and that such choices are regulatory in
their effects. Professor Lessig, for example, argued that the size
and weight of office buildings can be understood as a mechanism
for preventing their theft, just like a law against larceny.'9 Similarly,
he reasoned, code-based copyright protection for programs that
14See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 26 (1832).
"See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 126-32 (1991) (describing five different sources of regulation); Lessig, supra
note 3, at 86-90 (describing four modalities of regulation: law, markets, norms, and
architecture (code)). The antecedents for such general theories are in related sociological efforts. See, e.g., Donald Black, Toward a General Theory of Social Control,
at xi (Donald Black ed., 1984) (collecting articles). A survey of legal scholarship in
this vein can be found in Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud.
661 (1998).
16Lessig, supra note 3, at 86-90.
'7 Ellickson, supra note 15, at 4, 137-47. Oliver Williamson coined the phrase, see
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
83 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 520 (1983), although Ellickson popularized and expanded on
the criticism.
18See Lessig, supra note 3.
"Id. at 86-90.
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make software difficult to steal are a form of regulation." The same
goes for code-based content-filters that might it make it easier, or
harder, to reach an intended audience. The design of filters is simply the code-based regulation of speech.'
But as the scope of regulatory scholarship increases, it becomes
more apparent that there is something lopsided to the effort. Current scholarship pays great attention to the range of options available to regulators. But how much attention is paid to the reactions
of the regulated? The spirit of positive scholarship is to leave no
stone unturned in the assessment of regulatory effect. Fidelity to
that approach necessitates understanding not only regulation options, but also how the regulated might undermine or compromise
a regulatory scheme. If the goal of positive scholarship is to understand the net effect of the regulatory forces acting on a body, the
model is incomplete without incorporating the reaction to those
forces. But what form will such reactions take? And how effective
will they be?
Today, such questions are answered in different ways by different bodies of scholarship. In general, one answer comes from the
compliance literature: Groups will avoid laws they find burdensome. Another answer comes from writings in political choice:
groups will act to change disagreeable laws. This Part proposes to
reconcile and unite these divergent accounts of the behavior of the
regulated by analyzing the choice between avoidance and change.
B. When Groups Get Sick of Complying
What choices face an individual or group that decides to quit
complying with the law and to invest in some mechanism to change
its effects? This Section outlines the fundamental choice between
efforts to change and efforts to avoid laws.
First, a few assumptions should be made clear. Laws and other
regulations prevent groups from doing what they would otherwise
want to do. As Professor Tom Tyler puts it, "Laws are passed and
enforced to mandate behavior that people would prefer to
20

Id.

21See

generally Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filter-

ing, 38 Jurimetrics J. 629 (1998) (arguing that filters and technologies to facilitate filters might pose a greater threat than legislation to the interests of free speech).
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avoid .... It is a basic tenet of political theory that any society...
fails to provide its citizens with some thing they want and feel they
deserve. 22 A related assumption is that the initial content of laws
are exogenous, the result of an unspecified political process. 23 As a
result, groups often face laws with which they disagree and would
prefer to not follow, either in individual cases or as a general matter. In this model, compliance is driven by expected costs (punishments) deriving from legal sanctions (other sources are possible,
but omitted for the present). 24 Finally, a mechanism of legal influence is anything that, for a given price, buys a decrease in the expected punishment associated with violating a given law.
1. Avoidance Mechanisms
When and why do groups obey the law? Basic economic models
of compliance give a very simple answer: Laws are followed when
the expected costs of legal punishment exceed the expected benefits of the banned behavior.2 5 The result is commendably simple,
but, as theorists point out, only because it does not accurately describe when subjects obey the law. Two important sets of contributing factors are neglected. The first is extra-legal forces, such as social norms, that might contribute to compliance. The second is
investments in mechanisms of avoidance, or efforts that would
lower the expected costs of the law, which might lead to greater
non-compliance.
Efforts to broaden the basic model have focused on the first
point, focusing on the role that social norms and other factors play
in creating compliance. Both theory and some empirical studies
suggest that the threat of legal punishments alone cannot and does
22

Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 19-20 (1990).
assumption that the content of laws is exogenous becomes difficult to main-

23The

tain when we consider changing laws as a mechanism of response. In a subsequent
Section, I consider what happens when the assumption that laws are exogenous is relaxed. See infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
24
Cf. Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud and Kindred Puzzles of
The Law 17-30 (1996) (describing avoision of moral and ethical rules as comparable
to avoision of law). The concept of avoision is described more fully infra note 32.
25While this expression of the equation is quite simple, there is a great deal built
into each side. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 242 (5th ed.
1998) ("The model can be very simple: A person commits a crime because the expected benefits of the crime to him exceed the expected costs.").
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not fully explain why people obey or do not obey the law.16 Supplemental explanations tend to rely either on normative theories or
more advanced models of self-interested behavior. Some, like Professor Tyler, argue that normative considerations are central to
understanding the public's decision whether to comply or not.27
Others, like Professor Eric Posner, model extra-legal compliance
as self-interested signaling.28 Still others have modeled it as a part
of self-interested models of group interaction following gametheoretic models. 9
This Section, however, focuses on a different criticism of the basic economic model of compliance-that it fails to take into account investments in efforts to avoid the law. As much as the regulative effect of social norms may create more compliance than the
basic model predicts, investments in efforts to decrease or eliminate punishments may result in less compliance than predicted. In
their classic article, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensa26

See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 22, at 22 ("[T]he legal system cannot function if it can

influence people only by manipulating rewards and costs."); Ellickson, supra note 15,
at 137-47 (arguing that law's punishments only explain some of the social order we
see); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case Of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 1781, 1782 (2000) (observing that state punishment cannot explain tax compliance); Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and
the Role of Law 41-48 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=311879 (suggesting that state punishment of deviants supports social orders otherwise maintained by group sanctions). With mixed answers, some of the empirical studies of the relationship between legal threats and compliance include Isaac
Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 43
(1996) (surveying empirical work in this area); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Perceived Risk of Arrest: Testing and Expanded
Conception of Deterrence, 29 Criminology 561, 580-81 (1991) (arguing that certainty
of punishment plays a clear but minor role in determing compliance); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A
Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 Just. Q. 173 (1987) (suggesting weak correlation
between perceived certainty of detection and drug use).
" See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice
230-31 (1988) (developing a group value model to explain compliance); see generally
Tyler, supra note 22 (arguing that perception of legitimacy affects the decision to
comply).
2
Posner, supra note 26, at 88-111 (2000). Posner points out that the normative and
self-interested models of compliance can be unified by recognizing that effective signaling depends on laws being considered legitimate. See id. at 111.
29See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 15, at 137-47 (presenting a model premised on iterated prisoner's dilemma); Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 26 (same).
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tion of Enforcers, Professors Gary Becker and George Stigler first
argued that investments in avoidance should be considerations of
compliance.3 They added investments in bribery or intimidation to
a model of criminal behavior, pointing out that if a person had already violated the law, she would be willing to invest up to the
costs of the sanction to avoid punishment.' This insight suggests a
very basic point: compliance is not simply a function of punishments, but also of the cost of mechanisms to avoid punishment.32
The compliance literature surrounding particular statutory
regimes gives more particularized insight into how groups
avoid laws. Avoidance of laws is a particular focus of writings
on tax compliance,"3 and is also the subject of study in labor
law,34 criminal law,35 environmental law,36 and international

"See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1974).
3 Id. at 2-6. The observation was a short stop enroute to their proposal for private
enforcement of criminal law, and the debate over their paper has focused on the merits of private and public law enforcement. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin,
Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 Yale J.on Reg. 167 (1985) (arguing for shifting responsibility for implementing and enforcing public policy to private enforcement agents); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975) (responding to Becker and Stigler's proposal to privatize criminal law enforcement).
32This insight is described in greater depth at infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
13 See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals
Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 125
(2001) (concluding from a tax compliance study that normatively appealing to a taxpayer's conscience via a letter had an insignificant overall impact on tax compliance);
Michael J. Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of
Law Enforcement, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (1986) (modeling tax compliance as a game);
Posner, supra note 26, at 1782 (proposing a signaling model rather than the standard
state sanctioning model to explain tax compliance); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in
the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860, 884 (1999) (arguing that anti-abuse standards
would be more efficient than rules aimed at curbing tax avoidance).
" See Ronald Turner, Reactions of the Regulated: A Federal Labor Law Example,
17 Lab. Law. 479 (2002) (detailing ways in which groups practice avoision of labor
laws).
" See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385,
2414-15 (1997) (noting that a deterrence model in criminal law should focus on the
role of substitute products and complements to banned products and behavior).
'6 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental
Regulation?, 41 Washburn L.J. 515 (2002) (comparing the benefits of using tort law as
a system of privately enforced environmental protection to traditional public statutebased regulatory schemes).
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law.37 From these areas, a pattern emerges, indicating that there
are two fundamentally different ways to avoid a law's sanctions.
The first can be termed evasion. Evasion can be defined as an investment in decreasing the odds of being punished for violating a
law. Wearing a mask to rob a bank, buying a radar detector, hiring
expensive defense lawyers, and bribing police officers are all examples.38 Each, for a certain price, decreases the odds of being punished after the law is disobeyed.
There exists a second, less obvious way to avoid legal punishment. This is what Professor Leo Katz calls "avoision," which can
be defined as efforts to exploit the differences between a law's
goals and its self defined limits. As Professor Ronald Turner describes it, avoision represents "efforts to change legal mandates or
the avoidance of laws in ways that evade the law's intent or purpose but do not actually constitute unlawful behavior."39 Consider
the example of the pornographer who, worried about running afoul
of decency laws, puts his photos in a book along with incisive essays on "sex in marriage." Or consider the taxpayer who, blocked
from deducting a transfer of money to her son, devises a complicated loan scheme to achieve the same effect. Katz's book on
avoision is full of such examples from law and other aspects of
life. '° One may identify a similar dynamic in Professor Neal
Katyal's study of the role of substitute products in criminal deterrence.4' If, for example, the goal of the drug laws is to prevent addiction and abuse, a person who opts to become an alcoholic (legal) instead of a crack addict (illegal) is practicing avoision.
These writings paint the following picture: Groups, to minimize
the burdens of laws, will sometimes invest in avoidance. If the price
"Compliance in international law is studied in the absence of a centralized enforcement system, creating concerns more akin to the study of compliance with social
norms. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995) (studying compliance with
treaties); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) (studying compliance with customary international law).
'8 Some of these are ex post examples, others are ex ante. For present purposes they
are considered together.
" See Turner, supra note 34, at 479.
41 See generally Katz, supra note 24 (presenting
examples of avoision).
" See generally Katyal, supra note 35 (studying role of substitute products in models
of criminal deterrence).
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is right (more on this later),42 they will invest in mechanisms to
lower or eliminate the probability of being punished for disregarding a law. Groups may either decrease the probability of detection
(as in Becker's example of a bribe) or adopt other forms of conduct with the same effects (as in Katyal's substitution effect, or
Katz's avoision).
This might seem to deliver a full picture of how groups react to
laws. But even at this level of generality, writings on compliance
still deliver a limited picture of how individuals or groups might try
to defeat a regulatory scheme. For, as the political choice literature
teaches, groups also react to burdensome laws with efforts to
change the law. The next section considers change mechanisms as
an alternative.
2. Change Mechanisms
In the early 1990s, the dietary supplement industry faced a serious legal threat. Following several well-publicized deaths, the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") proposed to regulate popular
dietary supplements like other drugs, requiring proof of therapeutic value and carefully determined dosages.43 The reaction of the
supplement industry was to invest in an expensive but successful
lobbying campaign to change the law. Within a short time, Congress had passed legislation limiting the FDA's authority to regulate these products." It is by now a familiar insight from public
choice theory that groups that find a law disagreeable may try to
change it.45 In the 1970s, a series of articles written by economists
George J. Stigler and Sam Peltzman, ' followed by Robert E.
42

The effect of prices of mechanisms is discussed in infra text accompanying notes

66-70.
" See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690 (proposed June 18,

1993).
"See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417,
108 Stat. 4325, 4326 (1994). This Act amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA") classifying dietary supplements as a new category of food, thereby
preventing the FDA from regulating supplements as drugs or food additives.
"For a summary of work in this area, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II
(1989), particularly chapters 13 and 16.
46See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &

Econ. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Size of Legislatures, 5 J. Legal Stud. 17
(1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. of Econ. &
Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971) (presenting a general interest group theory of politics).
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McCormick and Robert D. Tollison's book, Politicians,Legislation,
and the Economy,47 first modeled legislation as wealth transfers
that interest groups purchased with money and votes. As Peltzman
put the basic premise: "I begin with the presumption that what is
basically at stake in regulatory processes is a transfer of wealth ....
[B]eneficiaries [of wealth transfers] pay with both votes and dollars. '' 48 Or, as Professors Richard Posner and William Landes described the legislative process, laws are sold for "campaign contributions, votes, implicit
promises of future favors, and sometimes
49
outright bribes.
The basic model treats legislative change as a commodity available for purchase. Since the introduction of the model, the literature studying the specific mechanics of interest groups and lawmaking has become more sophisticated. Professor Fred
McChesney, for example, proposes that law-makers are more extortionists than bribees. ° He highlights lobbying's defensive aspects
(Congress threatening legislation that groups pay to avoid), and
concludes that much of the political process can be better described as rent-extraction instead of rent-creation." A series of papers in the economics literature, meanwhile, tries to improve on
the simple bribery model with information theory, asserting that
lobbying works through the selective presentation of information.52
Despite these refinements, however, lobbying continues to be studied as a change mechanism-a tool that delivers or prevents legal
change for a price.
4"Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation and the
Economy (1981).
48Peltzman, supra note 46, at 213-14.

" William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 877 (1975).
" See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1987) [hereinafter McChesney, Rent Extraction]; see also Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing (1997) (developing and
broadening the rent extraction model) [hereinafter McChesney, Money for Nothing].
,McChesney, Rent Extraction, supra note 50, at 109-12.
'2 See, e.g., David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote, 9 Soc. Choice & Welfare 229 (1992) (developing a model of interest
group behavior based on the notion that such lobbying is the exercise of strategic information transmission); Johan Lagerlof, Lobbying, information and private and social welfare, 13 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1997) (same); Susanne Lohmann, Information,
access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying, 85 Pub. Choice 267 (1995)
(same).
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The process of achieving legal change through litigation has also,
though less often, been studied as an investment model. In Professors Landes's and Posner's first analysis of the independent judiciary, litigation served as a means of extending the value of the legislative bargains made between interest groups and the legislators.53
Professor Jeremy Rabkin, in a 1989 work, broadly argued that,
through their litigation strategies, interest groups determine or
radically influence the regulatory agendas of agencies."
In a 1991 essay Einer Elhauge argued that the litigation process
was equally, if not more, susceptible to interest group influence.5
He argued that, generally speaking, "the same interest groups that
have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and agencies also have an organizational advantage
in collecting resources to influence the courts."56 Therefore,
"[I]ncreasing the lawmaking power of the courts may only exacerbate the influence of interest groups."57 Whether Elhauge's specific
conclusion is right or wrong, he demonstrates that litigation campaigns can also be interpreted as investments in legal change.
This literature shows that mechanisms of change can be viewed
as an alternative to mechanisms of evasion for lowering the costs of
law.
3. Summary: The Change/Avoidance Choice
This Part has suggested that groups and individuals face a choice
between avoidance and change mechanisms when deciding how to
react to burdensome laws. Very simply, if a law is a cost on its subject, then avoidance and change mechanisms, the subjects of the
compliance and political choice literatures respectively, can be pictured as different directions of reaction, as follows.

"See Landes & Posner, supra note 49; Posner, supra note 25, at 587-90.
Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy
(1989).
" See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991).
56Id. at 67-68.
7
Id. at 68.
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As identified in the discussion above, within each broader category of mechanism, are specific subcategories, such as lobbying or
litigation in the case of change mechanisms, and evasion and
avoision in the case of avoidance mechanisms. Finally, while the
model here focuses on law as the regulatory modality, the basic
framework of analysis is meant for any source of regulation.
The following table summarizes the signal features of avoidance
and change mechanisms.58

Some people may feel discomfort at comparing change and avoidance in this fashion, but this discomfort may be useful and instructive. One can draw a parallel to Albert Hirschman's work on institutional feedback. See Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert
Hirschman (1970). Hirschman emphasized that members of declining institutions
faced a fundamental choice between "voice" and "exit" as forms of feedback. Despite
the different "feel" of voice and exit-study by different fields of scholarship, and the
sense of disloyalty evident in the latter-Hirschman maintained that a useful picture
of organizational feedback required understanding the choice. This Part suggests that
focusing on the choice between avoidance and change for groups faced with burdensome laws will yield similar dividends. As with voice and exit, we want to know the
conditions under which each option will prevail, and each strategy's comparative efficiency. And if tools of avoidance are growing in sophistication, as the example of code
design here studied suggests, it makes sense to understand what the consequences will
be.
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Table 1: Change & Avoidance
Change

Avoidance

Types

Litigation, Lobbying

Evasion, Avoision

Literature

Public Choice

Compliance

Nature of Good

Collective Good

Excludable Good

C. Group Dynamics, Collective Action

The distinction between a group's choice of a change or avoidance strategy is fundamental to understanding how groups deal
with laws they do not like. This Section links that choice to questions of group dynamics and problems of collective action.
In 1964, Professor Mancur Olson made a well-known contribution to the study of interest group behavior. 9 Using the logic of collective action, he divided those affected by regulation into two
main groups-those capable of effective political action, and the
"forgotten groups" who, he argued, "suffer in silence. ' The dividing line lay in the ability to overcome collective action problems.
Olson asserted that effective political action would generally represent a problem of collective action, making small groups and those
organized for some other purpose (like unions) effective political
actors and rendering large and disorganized groups essentially victims of the legislative process. 6' His model predicted that lobbies
"9
See Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (1965). The logic of collective action and the problem of free-riding now underlie most present-day studies of
lobbying and interest group behavior. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 17-21 (1991); McCormick & Tollison,
supra note 47, at 17-18 (discussing organizing costs); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical
Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1949-52 (1992)
(summarizing the lobbying advantages available to a small interest group).
60Olson, supra note 59, at 165.
61 Id. at 53-57, 132-34, 165-67.
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representing business, labor, agriculture, and professionals would
enjoy a perpetual advantage, leaving consumers and other latent
groups forgotten and even oppressed.62
The change/avoidance dichotomy suggests a different conclusion. Forgotten groups do not necessarily suffer in silence; instead,
they avoid laws with which they disagree, so long as doing so is
convenient. In the terms used here, the groups Olson identified as
incapable of collective action will generally lack the capacity to invest in change mechanisms. But that does not necessarily make
them inert when faced with burdensome laws. Rather, their recourse is limited to investing in avoidance mechanisms to decrease
the costs of laws. One may better understand Olson's dichotomy
between groups as an indication of who can take advantage of
change mechanisms.
This follows because change presents a collective action problem, while avoidance does not. Changes in laws display the classic
attributes of public goods. The repeal of the prohibition on alcohol
in the Eighteenth Amendment,63 for example, benefited all drinkers, not just those who contributed to the effort to repeal it. 64 Nor
was there any possibility that the repeal would be consumed or dissipated by overuse. As a result, economic theory predicts a freeriding or collective action problem: The beneficiaries of the change
will wait for others to invest in it and will subsequently free-ride on
those efforts.
None of this is true of avoidance mechanisms. When a thief
wears a mask to rob a bank, he is the sole and direct beneficiary of
his investment. The driver using a radar detector keeps the benefits
for herself. When a firm invests in a complicated tax avoidance
scheme, its competitors do not benefit. In other words, investments
in avoidance mechanisms create excludable, rivalrous goods. In
general, avoidance mechanisms will side-step the problems of collective action inherent in change mechanisms.65
62Id. at 133-67.
63See U.S. Const.

Amend. XXI, § 1.
"The repeal also cannot be "used up" by overconsumption. Legal change is an example of what economists call a public or collective good: It is both non-rival and
non-excludable. See Olson, supra note 57, at 14 (defining public good).
65A clever observer might object that this collective/private
good distinction seems
to blur on further inspection. Yes, a tax avoidance scheme delivers benefits for the
schemer, but if successful, it may serve as a useful model for others. A police officer,
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As a consequence it behooves third parties to sell avoidance to
diffuse groups. A third party can invent a mechanism for reducing
the costs of a given law, and then sell it to members of a diffuse
group for profit or fame. This is what happens when drivers buy
radar detectors, companies hire tax lawyers, or when music listeners download file-sharing software. A legal entrepreneur invests in
creating a means of lowering the costs of law, and then sells it to
groups that would otherwise comply.
A final complication with respect to avoidance and internal
group dynamics is worth stating. This Part, for simplicity's sake, has
modeled all laws simply as a cost to a regulated group, from which
they derive no benefit. But many laws provide both benefits and
costs, and this fact makes a difference for understanding the attraction of avoidance mechanisms. Avoidance mechanisms can be used
to lower the cost of a given legal regime, while continuing to enjoy
the benefits, through the rational exploitation of the compliance of
the rest of the regulated group. The successful bank robber wants
to steal money, but also wants to benefit from a healthy financial
system. Tax dodgers want to avoid paying taxes while ideally
enjoying public services paid for by everyone else. And, as the P2P
filesharing case study explores in greater depth, getting music for
free probably works best when most of the population continues to
pay retail.
once bribed, might be easier to bribe in the future. The cars behind the driver with the
radar detector might guess why she brakes suddenly. So does avoidance really present
a different kind of collective action problem than investments in change?
It does, I suggest, because all of the examples posited simply represent the consumption of a private good that creates a positive externality. This distinction can be
illustrated by the "popcorn/incense" example. Consider that cooking and eating popcorn will create a delicious fragrance from which others cannot be excluded. That fact
does not make the popcorn itself a public good. The buyer of the popcorn reaps the
reward of her investment, while also conferring a benefit on her peers. Hence, diffuse
unorganized groups should be expected to eat popcorn despite the collective benefit
conferred.
Replace popcorn with bribing a police officer and the same results are obtained.
The briber personally reaps the benefits of the bribe in a fashion excludable and rivalrous, but she also confers a benefit on all future bribers.
Conversely, in the domain of public fragrance, the appropriate parallel to a change
mechanism like lobbying is the burning of incense. It costs money to burn incense so
as to produce a pleasant fragrance for the benefit of all. Hence, unlike popcorn, only

organized groups will burn incense, just as only organized groups will invest in lobbying campaigns.
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D. Deciding to Quit
Groups do not spend all their time avoiding laws or trying to
change them; most people comply with most laws most of the time.
When do individuals or groups decide to quit obeying the law and
instead invest in some way to way to avoid or change it? The basic
deterrence model discussed above suggests that this happens when
the cost of compliance exceeds the expected cost of punishment.
Theorists supplement that model by accounting for compliance
stemming from costs associated with social norms and other
sources. One may derive a more complete answer by introducing
the option of investing in mechanisms to decrease legal66 or other
costs. The following discussion will show two things. First, compliance can be understood to depend less on punishment than on the
cost of mechanisms of change or avoidance. Second, this discussion
will demonstrate the effect of a group's ability to act collectively,
pooling resources to invest in legal change.
First, examine a basic case where groups obey the law when expected costs of disobedience exceed expected benefits and where
there are no mechanisms to influence the law. If a traffic law mandates a fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit, the expected benefit of
ignoring the law and driving eighty miles-per-hour might be $50,
while the expected cost will be the price of the speeding ticket multiplied by the chance of getting caught (say, 20% x $500 = $100).
With these parameters the driver will not speed. The result is compliance and the law is a "success."
Compliance Given No Investments inResponse
Assume:
(1) Speed limit = 55 mph

(2)Benefit of driving 80 mph = $50
(3)Expected Costs = (Sanction) x (Probability of Detection) = $500 x
0.2 = $100

Result: Driver complies with law, because expected costs > expected
benefits.
6 A caveat is necessary. At this stage, the model that follows is admittedly legallycentrist. For simplicity's sake, it does not include the compliance produced by norms
or other modalities of regulation.
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Now, allow for the option of investing in a mechanism that influences the expected costs of the law. As discussed above, Becker
and Stigler's original example was the bribe; for a certain fee, a
bribe reduces the expected costs of a law to zero (by eliminating
any chance of detection).67 There are, however, a wide variety of
mechanisms beyond bribes that will accomplish the same effect.
For the driver, there exists a strategy of avoidance and one of
change: investing in a radar detector and lobbying to repeal the
speeding law, respectively.
Individuals and groups will invest in a mechanism of legal influence when it becomes cheaper to do so than to simply comply with
the law. Entities will invest in such mechanisms when the expected
benefits exceed the sum of the response strategy cost and the expected costs of non-compliance (as reduced through the mechanism).
One may describe this dynamic with a very simple equation.
Groups that have the option of purchasing mechanisms of legal influence will do so when:
Expected Benefits > (Expected Costs - Mechanism Effect) +
Cost of Mechanism
Apply this framework to two of the preceding examples: radar
detectors and lobbying. First, consider a $40 radar detector that
eliminates any chance of being caught speeding. For the driver discussed above, this is a worthwhile investment. For the price of the
radar detector ($40), he gets to drive at eighty miles-per-hour
(benefit $50) and is therefore $10 ahead. The driver is pleased, but
is not; the law that was once a "success" is now a
the regulator
68
"failure."

67
6

Becker & Stigler, supra note 30, at 5-6.
Notice that for simplicity's sake, this hypothetical has neglected the government's

response: government can, as some states do, ban the radar detector (but more on this
later).
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Compliance Given a Perfect $40 Radar Detector
Assume:
(4) Probability of detection = 0%
(5) Expected benefit of speeding = $50
(6) Expected cost of radar detector = $40
(7) Expected cost of legal punishment = $500 x 0 = 0
$50 > 0 + $40

Result: Driver disregards law.
This example demonstrates that if the mechanism of legal influence is 100% effective, like our radar detector, the expected cost of
legal sanctions is reduced to zero, and thus can be eliminated from
the basic investment equation. Therefore, given perfectly effective
mechanisms, the only relevant inputs are the expected benefits and
the cost of the response strategy, and the equation can be simplified as follows:
Investment when:
Expected Benefit > Cost of Mechanism
In other words, in a world where avoidance or change is entirely
effective, compliance with current law has little to do with punishment, but is instead a direct function of how much it costs to buy a
way out.
Consider a few implications of this analysis. The first example
involves an avoidance strategy. If the speed limit were one hundred
miles-per-hour, and hence not much of a burden, few individuals
would buy the perfect $40 radar detector. Conversely, if the speed
limit were lowered to ten miles-per-hour, an onerous burden, everyone would want a perfect radar detector, even if it cost $500. Finally, notice that if the price of the perfect radar detector suddenly
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falls to $1, it may become a worthwhile investment, even for the
nearly costless one hundred mile-per-hour speed limit.69
The second example involves a lobbying campaign. Assume it
would cost $100,000 to organize a campaign to repeal the speeding
laws. For the individual driver, the lobbying campaign is not a
worthwhile purchase. The benefit of driving at eighty miles-perhour is only $50. The cost of the campaign would leave the driver
$99,950 in the red, unless he were somehow able to charge his fellow drivers for the successful repeal, an unlikely prospect.
Compliance Given a $100,000 Lobbying Campaign
Assume:
(8) Repeal makes expected costs = $0
(9) Expected benefit of speeding $50
(10) Expected cost of campaign $100,000
$50 < $100,000
Result: Driver complies with law.

Would it make sense for the affected group (all drivers) to invest
in a campaign to repeal the speeding laws? Assume that there are
100,000 drivers in the lawmaking jurisdiction (a state). If the drivers organize themselves so as to divide the costs of the repeal campaign, they pay $1 each, and such an arrangement is clearly a good
deal for all involved. Stated otherwise, the cost of compliance for
the group is $50 times 100,000 drivers, or $5 million. The lobbying
campaign is, therefore, a bargain.
benefits of not having to comply with the law must be greater than the cost of
a response strategy for any investment to happen at all. This necessity is a consequence of perspective; the assumption is that the individual is complying with the law,
and deciding whether to invest in some way to make it worthwhile not to comply. In
contrast, Becker and Stigler's original model posited a criminal already in violation of
the law, and suggested that "[t]he violator would be willing to bribe as much as [the
fine] to ignore the evidence." Becker & Stigler, supra note 30, at 5. While the behavior of violators is of interest, it generally seems more interesting to understand what
individuals already regulated by the law will do, instead of assuming that they will
69The

break it.
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Compliance Given a $100,000 Lobbying Campaign (2)
Assume:
(11) Repeal makes expected costs = $0
(12) Group expected benefit of speeding = $5 million
(13) Expected cost of campaign = $100,000

$5,000,000 > $100,000
Result: Group repeals speeding laws.

If these numbers are even close to realistic, then why are there
traffic laws or any other laws that large groups find disagreeable?
As already demonstrated and as basic political choice theory
teaches, the answer is that groups such as drivers are not organized
and have no effective mechanism to divide the costs of a campaign
to change the law.7' This demonstrates the conclusion urged above:
Groups incapable of collective action tend toward avoidance
mechanisms, while the organized invest in mechanisms of change.
E. Avoidance, Change, and Regulatory Competition
This Article has until now focused on first-generation reactions-those of an interest group to a disagreeable law. This Section adds "reactions to the reaction" to show how regulatory competition between two opposing groups develops, with each
investing in efforts to influence the law in its favor. For this analysis, the model of rent-seeking competitions is a useful descriptive,
though not necessarily normative, guide.
The model has thus far treated laws exclusively as exogenously
imposed costs on regulated groups. A more realistic model recognizes that the content of laws is a function of group interests, so
that for every regulated group there exists a beneficiary group." For
example, if a law bans noisy sound trucks then the law regulates
70See

discussion of group dynamics, supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
" Cf. McCormick & Tollison, supra note 47 (modeling groups in competition for
legislative wealth transfers).
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advertisers in the interest of town residents.72 Successful efforts to
avoid or change the law may, therefore, inspire the beneficiary
group to invest in its own mechanism of legal influence in an effort
to restore the lost benefit. This investment, in turn, may inspire the
regulated group to reinvest in mechanisms of influence, leading to
a full-fledged cycle of regulatory competition. The cycle continues
as long as each group values sufficiently the prize of a law tailored
in its favor.
Just as group identity and dynamics influenced the actions of the
regulated group, we should expect them to do the same for the
beneficiary group. An organized, politically effective beneficiary
group faced with evasion may turn to the legislature with a request
to "restore the balance." On the other hand, diffuse beneficiaries
may do little to react effectively.
Consider the following contrast. The P2P story features a subset
of music consumers, in ferocious competition with the music industry, trying to avoid copyright laws. Faced with a threat to their
copyright rents, the industry reacted with litigation, lobbying, and
even technological countermeasures (detailed in Part III). In contrast, avoidance of state taxation through online and mail-order
catalogues is now a regular phenomenon. Yet the diffuse beneficiaries of state taxation have done little to resist the eroding collection of state value-added taxes. 3 Unsurprisingly, the organization
of the beneficiaries matters as much as the organization of the
regulated.
The notions of regulatory competitions are a favorite subject of
the rent-seeking literature, and it is tempting to cast matters in
such terms. Professor Anne Krueger's original description of rentseeking suggested that laws create rents and that people will compete for them in various ways: "[s]ometimes, such competition is
perfectly legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms,
such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets."74 Arguably, any group interested in changing a law to minimize its
regulatory costs is engaged in a form of rent-seeking. The battle
" See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
,3 On the contrary, Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act,
47 U.S.C. § 151
(1998), restricting the power of states to tax Internet-based commerce.
74Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am.
Econ. Rev. 291,291 (1974).
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between P2P programmers and the recording industry, described in
Part III, can be described as a gigantic dissipation of rents created
by the monopolistic copyright system.
Groups reacting to law are acting in a self-interested fashion,
and this may lead to a competition to influence the law's effects.
For several reasons, however, I am hesitant to cast the questions
studied in this Part within the normative framework of rentseeking. Rent-seeking is a useful tool when it suggests that certain
models of regulation will encourage wasteful behavior and should
therefore be avoided. In other words, the study of rent-seeking is
the study of waste management. The goals of this Part, however,
are different. They are to develop a positive model describing the
choices that groups face under burdensome regulation. Determining whether the reduction in rents is "worth" any particular legal
regime is beyond this Part's scope.
In addition, the interests of the rent-seeking literature are different than those of this Article. What makes a tool interesting to the
rent-seeking literature is its potential for generating waste and the
existence or absence of any socially valuable byproduct. Hence,
what scholars study for rent-dissipating effects can range from research and development (rent dissipation in pursuit of patent follow-ons)75 to follow-on creation in copyright76 to efforts to monopolize.77 It is nonetheless extremely difficult to evaluate whether
alternative mechanisms of undermining legal systems have less or
more valuable byproducts." Is investing in a tax shelter more or
less socially wasteful than lobbying? Such questions seem nearly
impossible to answer. What this Part examines is not the relative
wastefulness of mechanisms used to influence law, but their relative cost and relationship to group dynamics.
" See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977) (describing patents as prospects that prevent waste in follow-on development).
"6See generally Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy (Geo. Mason L. &
Econ. Research Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=374580 (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(arguing that copyright laws prevent wasteful redundancy).
r See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807
(1975) (modeling and estimating social costs of monopoly and monopoly-inducing
regulation in the U.S.).
See id. at 811 (analyzing assumption that expenditures on monopolizing have no
socially beneficial byproduct).
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F. How Code is Used to Avoid Law

The premise of this Article is that "law-busting" code should be
studied as a mechanism of legal influence. That is to say, it can usefully be studied alongside litigation, lobbying, tax avoision, and
other ways groups seek to influence the law in their favor. This final Section asks: how exactly does code influence the effects of
law? And how does it fit within the avoidance/change dichotomy
just described?
The hint of an answer comes from existing work that tries to understand the role code plays in the legal environment." In Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Professor Lessig writes that "[i]n
cyberspace we must understand how code regulates ....Code is
law."80 Similarly, writers like Professors Tom Bell or Kenneth
Dam, interested in "technological self-help," are primarily concerned with the use of code as a substitute for contract, copyright,
or other legal systems.8 '
Even though this work is interested in code "as law," its depiction of how code achieves regulatory effects if useful. The idea is
that code regulates by directly constraining behavior. Lessig argues
that code "constitute[s] a set of constraints on how you behave;"82 it
"constrains some behavior by making other behavior possible, or
impossible."83 Just as a brick wall built in the middle of the road
modifies behavior, code regulates by specifiying, in advance, what
behavior is and is not possible. Similarly, I propose that code can
influence the effects of law by redesigningbehavior for legal advantage. That is to say, the reason that code matters for law at all is its
capability to define behavior on a mass scale. This capability can

79A common question is this: Is there any particular significance to code in this regard, as opposed to just advances in technology and their effects on compliance? The
argument for a special relevance for code relies on the idea that computer code has
achieved a greater granularity than the technologies that preceded it: Programmers
can very precisely shape behavior using code to match the particularized loopholes in
laws. At previous levels of technology, conversely, such questions would arise less
frequently.
oLessig, supra note 3, at 89.
81See Bell, supra note 4 (providing a model of technological self-help); Dam, supra
note 4 (same).
' Lessig, supra note 3, at 6, 89.
83
1d.
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mean constraints on behavior, in which case code regulates, but it
can also mean shaping behavior into legally advantageous forms.
In this view, the code designer acts like a tax lawyer. He looks
for loopholes or ambiguities in the operation of law (or, sometimes, ethics). More precisely, he looks for places where the stated
goals of the law are different than its self-defined or practical limits. The designer then redesigns behavior to exploit the legal weakness.
Code design, as we have seen it, is a mechanism of avoidance
rather than a mechanism of change. Nothing the code designer
does rewrites laws. Instead, code design defines behavior to avoid
legal sanctions. This description of how code "works" to influence
law's effects, I suggest, fits most of the major efforts to use code for
legal advantage. Consider four examples:
Virtual Child Pornography.Congress passes a law banning child
pornography, citing a compelling interest in preventing harm to
children. Programmers create child pornography that involve no
children in its production. The behavior has been reshaped to
adapt to the limit on government's power in the First Amendment.8
Overseas Gambling. Laws banning gambling are territorial in jurisdiction. Casinos place their servers overseas. The conduct of
gambling has been reshaped to avoid the law's self-defined jurisdictional limits.
Junk Email. Unsolicited advertising by mail and fax are regulated by laws specific to the mail system and fax machine, respectively. Advertisers design programs to transmit electronic mail and
pop-up advertisements. The use of junk email gives advertisers an
unregulated partial substitute for the mail or fax machines.
P2P Filesharing.The legality and ethics of "home copying" are
somewhat ambiguous, and copyright has no record of enforcement
against end-users. Designers build software that shapes the mass
distribution of copyrighted works into a form resembling home
copying.
None of this, of course, is a comment on whether these strategies
will be successful in the long term. Each, as previous sections sug' Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (striking down ban
on computer-generated child pornography).
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gest, may incur a reaction to the reaction-an effort to change the
law to "restore the balance." But it is clear from these examples
how code design achieves its effects.
This basic theory of mechanisms underlies the claims in the rest
of the Article. Part II examines the important example of P2P
filesharing to show how, in practice, the design of code influences
the effects of law.
II.

COPYRIGHT'S LOOPHOLES

On December 8, 1999, a group of eighteen record companies announced that they had sued a small startup company for copyright
infringement.85 The Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") forecast that it could do 100 million dollars in damage
to sales,86 yet the company was virtually unknown. In the mainstream press the company had previously drawn only a blurb, described by Fortune magazine as "a unique online MP3 trading
community.., that enables users to trade songs directly."'
This unknown company was Napster. Its product was an application that facilitated the trading of music files. Napster functioned
like a "bazaar," alleged the plaintiffs,' but one where the goods
were all free. Users logged in, searched a central database of songs
that other users had made available, and then took the files they
wanted directly from other users. 9 Lawyers for the recording industry accused the little company of operating a "haven for music
piracy on an unprecedented scale" and an "online bazaar" for illegal trading.' Napster responded that it simply provided a "listing
service."91
" See Don Clark, Recording Industry Group Sues Napster, Alleging Copyright Infringement on Net, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at B18.
'6 Id.
" Lauren Goldstein, Tune In: MP3 goes mainstream, but Internet music has yet to
find its perfect form, Fortune, Dec. 1, 1999, at 268.
" Complaint at 2, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (No. C99-5183-MHP), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/napster/
riaa/napsterscomplaint.pdf (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter Complaint].
9 See Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella
and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1761,
1768 (2001).
9 Complaint, supra note 88, at 2.
91Clark, supra note 85, at B18.
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If not as ruinous as the recording industry suggested it would
be, 92 Napster emerged as a powerful force in the distribution of music. At its height, Napster claimed sixty million registered users and
as many as twenty-six million active ones.93 By February of 2001,
analysts estimated that Napster users were trading nearly three billion songs, or the equivalent of two hundred million CDs, in a single month." The economic effects of Napster on the music industry
were, naturally, disputed in litigation.95 According to some figures,
global music sales tumbled nearly half a billion dollars in 2000.96
Sales of CD singles (the clearest Napster competitor) declined
nearly forty percent that year.97 In contrast, other studies suggested
that Napster actually led its users to buy more CDs. 9'
How did any of this happen? How did a simple program have
such a powerful effect on levels of compliance with copyright law?
" See Complaint, supra note 88, at 3 (alleging that "Napster's conduct has caused
and continues to cause plaintiffs grave and irreparable harm").
" The estimates of Napster's use vary. See, e.g., Jon Healey, Napster CEO Pitching
a New Tune to Labels, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 2001, at C5 (reporting sixty million active
users at Napster's peak); Napster Use Slumps 65%, BBC News, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1449127.stm (July 20, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (reporting statistics from Jupiter Media Metrix stating
that Napster had 26.4 million active users in February 2001 before the numbers began
to decline).
9 See Geoff Nicholson, Will the RIAA pass up Napster's $1 billion offer?, at
http://www.hitsquad.com/smm/news/708/ (Feb. 21, 2001) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
" See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909-11 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(summarizing the findings of several studies of Napster's economic impact). A later
study by economist Stan Leibowitz concludes that Napster's effects were not proven
in the Napster litigation, but that peer filesharing should be expected to hurt the music industry in the long term. Stan Liebowitz, Policing Pirates in the Networked Age
14-15 (Cato Policy Analysis No. 438 May 15, 2002), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa438.pdf (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
" Patrick Brethour, Music sales tumble 1.3% worldwide, The Globe and Mail (Boston), Apr. 20, 2001, at B1.
97Jeff Leeds, Record Industry Says Napster Hurt Sales, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 2001,
at C1.
98See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 910 (citing several studies but refusing to rely on
them); Kim Chipman, Napster More Likely to Help, Not Hurt, Music Sales,
Bloomberg News, July 21, 2000 (noting that "most attrition [cited by the RIAA] took
place before Napster's launch"); Liam Lahey, Angus Reid Study: Napster is improving CD sales, ComputerWorld Canada, Sept. 22, 2000, at 1, available at
http://www.itworldcanada.com/portals/portalDisplay.cfm?oid=El9EF5FC-878345AE-AB14E3C8BA85856F (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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Everyone knows the basic story, but students of enforcement and
compliance lack an explanation for why the copyright regime, relative to other sets of laws, proved so vulnerable to code-based attack. What is it about the enforcement structure of the copyright
system that made it so easy to defeat? And does it share characteristics with other legal enforcement systems?
This Part argues that the success of P2P depends on two powerful and often unrecognized weaknesses of the copyright regime.
The first is the law's dependence on a gatekeeper enforcement regime. The second is a severe and unusual lack of normative support among the regulated.
These weaknesses suggest several conclusions about the nature
of P2P and code design as mechanisms of avoidance. P2P, in particular, probably implicates the specific weaknesses of the copyright system more than it implicates vulnerabilities in other sets of
legal rules. As a general rule, code design will depend on identifiable weaknesses in legal enforcement.
A. Copyright and Its Gatekeepers
Common intuition dictates that laws can be vulnerable to mass
disobedience, whether at rock concerts or during tax time. These
problems stem from the limits and costs of "primary" enforcement
(enforcement against individual violators). The costs of raising
punishments increase while the benefits exhibit diminishing returns. Theorists explain these limits as stemming from administrative and third party costs, the limited net worth of defendants, the
lack of any punishment beyond the death penalty, and even the
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments."
Due to the limitations of primary enforcement, many legal regimes charged with mass regulation come to depend on supplemental enforcement measures. A chief example is what Professor
Kraakman termed a "gatekeeper" regime."° To supplement direct
enforcement of a law, the state attaches liability to the provision of
99These reasons are summarized in Posner, supra note 25, at 243-50; Kraakman, supra note 10, at 56-57. See also Katyal, supra note 35, at 2414-15 ("But the range of
sanction levels may be subject to a maximum sanction constraint-either because
there is no room for increased penalty (beyond death) or because such equality in
punishment
would contravene other, moral, theories of punishment.").
00

' Kraakman, supra note 10, at 53.
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specialized goods or services, disrupting misconduct in advance."'
Doctors, for example, are gatekeepers for prescription drugs. By
withholding their provision of drugs to would-be abusers, doctors
aid in the enforcement of the laws regulating controlled substances.
Copyright law's long dependence on a gatekeeping regime is under-recognized.' 2 The copyright law regulates a large and disparate
group of content consumers, such as music listeners and book
readers. The solution to mass disobedience in this area has involved one such gatekeeper regime. That is, copyright law achieved
compliance through the imposition of liability on a limited number
of intermediaries-those capable of copying and distributing works
on a mass scale. The gatekeepers were book publishers at first;
later gatekeepers included record manufacturers, film studios, and
others who produced works on a mass scale. Their role resembled
that of doctors with respect to prescription drugs-they prevented
evasion of the law by blocking the opportunity to buy an infringing
product in the first place.

...
In his influential 1986 article, Kraakman demonstrated that "gatekeeper liability"
could create additional deterrence relative to primary enforcement. See id. at 87-93.
That article has inspired a gatekeeper literature, primarily focused on gatekeepers in
the financial services industries. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916, 918 (1998) (arguing that analysis of reputational intermediaries remains incomplete without consideration of a variety of additional factors); Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers, 18 Int'l
Rev. L. & Econ. 365, 365 (1998) (analyzing gatekeeper regimes in tax enforcement);
Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 883-84 (1990) (analyzing the gatekeeper role lawyers play in
avoiding strategic litigation); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians At The Gatekeepers?: A
Proposal For A Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 491, 491-93
(2001) (arguing for a strict liability gatekeeper regime for securities fraud). None,
however, considers a statute's dependence on gatekeeper liability to be a potential
weakness.
1"2 One notable exception to this generalization is Randal C. Picker, Copyright as
Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 Antitrust Bull. 423, 432 (2002). A
similar notion is reflected in the distinction between "broad-based" and "targeted"
enforcement in Rick Harbaugh & Rahul Khemka, Does copyright enforcement encourage piracy? (Claremont Colleges working paper in economics, Aug. 2001), available at http://econ.mckenna.edu/papers/2000-14.pdf (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association). One reason copyright's dependence on gatekeepers may be under-recognized is possibly because most of copyright law is found under the civil, as
opposed to the criminal titles of the law. Yet there is no reason to suppose from first
principles that a civil regime cannot also harness the power of a gatekeeper liability
regime.
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That intermediaries play some role in copyright enforcement is
widely recognized' 3-it could not be otherwise after the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios."' Writers have hinted at the potential dependence of copyright on a gatekeeper system. As Professor Jane Ginsberg noted in 1995:
Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users
of copyrighted works. This is in part because pursuing the ultimate consumer is costly and unpopular. But the primary reason
has been because end users did not copy works of authorship-or
if they did copy, the reproduction was insignificant and rarely the
subject of widespread further dissemination."°5
There is evidence to suggest that copyright was in fact entirely dependent on gatekeeper enforcement until quite recently. Unfortunately, academic study of copyright enforcement is sparse." What
we can learn about enforcement patterns comes largely from the
few hearings and congressional studies on copyright enforcement
and the case record itself.
Reflecting an interest in bigger targets, copyright laws reflected
an indifference to private, home copying in the 1960s and early
1970s. In 1971, Congress commented that copyright was never
meant to "restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from
tapes or records, of recorded performances."'" ° Congress described
the practice of non-commercial home recordings as "common and
"03
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 111 (2001) ("Our copyright laws have,
until now, focused primarily on the relationships among those who write works of authorship and disseminate those works to the public."); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars
On The "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1466, 1488 (1995) (discussing the role of intermediaries).
'464 U.S. 417 (1984). In the Sony litigation, the broadcasting industry targeted
Sony and its new Betamax videotape recorder, as opposed to end-users, when it unsuccessfully tried to have Sony held contributorily liable for any illegal taping of television shows. Id. at 456.
105 Ginsburg, supra note 103, at 1488.
'6While many authors discuss the challenge of new technology for intellectual
property laws, it is difficult to find academic work on actual patterns of enforcement.
One student note has tackled the problem, relying principally on congressional
sources. See Jayashri Srikantiah, Note, The Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive Copying Technology, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1634, 1643-45
(1996).
'07H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971).
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unrestrained." 8 In the 1973 photocopying case Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, the United States Court of Claims similarly
stated, "[I]t is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can
make a handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his
own use ....
These customary facts of copyright-life are among our
givens."0 9
Even in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress made the decision to
limit the exclusive right of performance of audiovisual works to
public performances, thereby excluding private or home performances."' In recommending this limit, the Copyright Office explained that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the
home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction
can or should be precluded by copyright."'' . The law's indifference
toward home copying was evident in the obvious lack of enforcement. The case record is perhaps the strongest evidence of the operation of the old regime. One is pressed to find any example of
copyright law being enforced against individuals for home copying
(as opposed to commercial activity) prior to 1990. In the 1979 Sony
Betamax case, copyright owners added a representative individual
to the complaint, but they did not seek relief against him."2 Beyond
this limited example,3 individualized infringement actions were absent until the 1990s."
The Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States and
others like it come closest to primary enforcement against indi-

0 Id.
,o487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975).
"'17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
,.Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 30 (Comm. Print 1961).
11 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal.
1979); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 434 ("The two respondents in this case do not seek
relief against the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights.").
"3 The 1990s saw an effort by software copyright owners to enforce copyrights
against end-users, who tend to be fairly large entities. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hurt, Software Pirates Sued: Alleged culprits targeted online auction bidders, Business 2.0,
(Jan. 26, 2001), at http://www.business2.com/articles/web/print/0,1650,16147,00.html
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). For an argument that such enforcement actually creates more piracy, see Harbaugh & Khemka, supra note 102, at
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viduals."' Dowling featured two Elvis enthusiasts who pressed unreleased recordings without permission-so-called "bootleggers....5

But these bootleggers actually created sizable distribution channels. The two hobbyists grew to do "substantial business,"."6 eventually functioning just like regular record-sellers themselves. They
printed catalogs and advertisements, and they sold and distributed
thousands of albums. "7 Were these Elvis bootleggers gatekeepers
in the enforcement sense? They were, in the sense that the endusers of the Elvis bootlegs would be unable to obtain their product
without the cooperation of Dowling and company.
Mass home copying became an issue in the late 1980s and
prompted some examination of how copyright enforcement
worked. "8 As the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
stated in its 1989 report, "All U.S. copyright law, including the
Copyright Act of 1976, proceeds on the assumption that effective
and efficient copying is a large-scale, publicly visible, commercial
activity, and therefore, that legal prohibitions against unauthorized
copying are enforceable."... 9 This report, echoed by hearings on
copyright enforcement in the 1980s, confirmed that the existing
pattern of enforcement by the RIAA and the motion picture industry targetted large-scale commercial pirates.'2 ° After clarifying
copyright's long reliance on a gatekeeper system, one may specify
more precisely why the changes of the 1980s and 1990s altered the
face of copyright enforcement.

14

473 U.S. 207 (1985). Other examples of enforcement against small intermediaries

include United States v. Drum, 733 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1984) (enforcing against a
bootlegging enterprise), and Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Labus, No. 89-C-797-C,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11754 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 1990) (involving the operator of a
small resort sued for renting pirated movies to his customers).
473 U.S. at 210-11.
16 Id. at 212.
117Id. at 211-12.
"' The Office of Technology Assessment noted that the proportion of people who
made home audiotapes doubled in the 1980s. Office of Tech. Assessment, supra note
11, at iii.
11 Id. at 7.
12 See Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Copyright Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 41 (1985) (statement of Donald C. Curran, Acting Register of Copy-

rights) ("RIAA is selective in what they refer to Justice, turning over only the most
egregious cases.").

716

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 89:679

B. The Erosion of the Gatekeeper System
Gatekeeper regimes have an obvious weakness: They depend on
a specialized good or service remaining specialized. For the 270
years following copyright's 1710 debut, this remained the case for
copyrighted works-copies could not be produced by just anyone.
As demonstrated by Dowling, there could and did arise corruptible
publishers who would produce illicit copies (just as corruptible doctors hand out illicit drugs), but so long as the costs of finding such
corrupted intermediaries remained reasonable, gatekeeper liability
continued to prevent copyright infringement.
The erosion of copyright's gatekeeper system is an ongoing and
incomplete process. The erosion proceeded in several steps, culminating in the advanced versions of P2P filesharing networks evident today.
Digitalization-the ability to make perfect digital copies of content-was the beginning of a real problem for the gatekeeper regime. It made copying certain forms of content possible for anyone
with a computer. As the Office of Technology Assessment documented in 1989, the extent of an individual's copying power was
mainly limited to computer software and analog taping of television programs and music. 21 By the 1990s, an individual's ability to
copy spread to music (with the advent of powerful compression algorithms) and, to some extent, books and film.
It is important to understand that digitalization itself did not
mean the end of the gatekeeper system: It simply put home copying within easy reach. Mass distribution, however, remained (and
still remains, for most works) a gate kept by a few. So long as mass
distributors of content remained identifiable and easy to sueretail outlets, publishers, and so on-the gatekeeper regime could
remain effective.
Hence, the mass popularity of the Internet in the mid-1990s was
another step toward the erosion of the gatekeeper system. But it is
also a mistake to confuse the potential of the Internet as a mass
dissemination system with the development of an application for
such purposes. 122 Web-based Internet outlets-say, online retailers
2' See
122See

Office of Tech. Assessment, supra note 11, at iii.
generally Wu, supra note 7 (pointing out that the Internet and its applications

should be understood separately for legal analysis).
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like Amazon.com-were and are no less amenable to being copyright gatekeepers. It took the design of P2P filesharing systems,
however, to realize the full extent of the network's structural challenge to a gatekeeper liability system.
A pure P2P design is the logical corollary to a gatekeeper enforcement system. The design goal of a pure P2P network is the
complete elimination of intermediaries. Such a pure P2P network
is a network of perfect equals, each of which is both a consumer
and a distributor of copyrighted materials. Such a network would
force those who enforce copyrights to rely exclusively on primary
enforcement, with its attendant difficulties.
Today's successful P2P filesharing applications approach, but do
not achieve, a pure P2P model. The following Section explains
why.
C. Elements of Peer Design
The design of P2P applications to avoid copyright presents a
technical challenge with implications not fully appreciated by legal
scholarship."2 The technical study of P2P design shows that designing a P2P filesharing network to avoid copyright requires important deviations from the optimal design for speed, control, and usability. The programmers of a copyright-resistant P2P network
must balance an interest in avoiding legal liability against the competing interests of ensuring performance on a mass scale, maintaining system stability, and fostering network trust. These matters all
require control over the network, while a pure peer design eliminates control as much as possible.
The goals of peer filesharing applications are a good place to begin the discussion. Two people can trade files easily, using email or
a floppy disk, but what about one million people? The general goal
of a P2P filesharing network is to enable millions of home users to
trade files amongst themselves, quickly and easily. Such a program
generally requires three elements. First, it requires a program that
regular home users can download-a program that, running on
their computers, can locate other users, creating a network of
" For a good summary of some of these challenges, see Theodore Hong, Performance, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive Technology 203, 20506 (Andy Oram ed., 2001).
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peers. Second, it requires a way for each user to search the network
(or parts of it) to determine what content others are making available. Third, it requires a way for users to send files to each other
once they have found something desirable.
Designers accomplish these filesharing goals using a P2P design.
Formally, a P2P network is an application architecture where each
"node," or computer, has equivalent rights and responsibilities. 24'
Figure 1: Design of a Peer-to-Peer versus a Client-Server Network
Peer Network

Client-Server Network

Peer A
Server

PeerD

Peer B

Peer C

"Study Group"

Client A

Client B

Client C

"Lecture"

This design, as the name suggests, makes a P2P network one of
equals, or peers. This network architecture should, usually, be distinguished from a "client-server" network in which one computer
(the server) specializes in serving the needs of others (the clients).
Real-world metaphors help capture this important distinction.
Consider the difference between a study group comprised entirely
of students and a lecture led by a teacher. On the one hand, the
study group is a peer network. Each member has both the responsibility to share materials and the right to take materials from others. On the other hand, the classroom is a "client-server" network.
124See

Michael A. Gallo & William A. Hancock, Networking Explained 17 (1999).
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The teacher specializes in teaching the students. The students do
not teach the teacher or each other. The network is centralized,
and each node is specialized.
A pure peer design is "flat," with equal, non-specialized members. Client-server designs are hierarchical, with a specialized
server. Each design has it own uses, but only peer networks
threaten the gatekeeper structure of copyright enforcement.
D. Purity in Peer Design
The distinction between peer and client-server designs is critical
to understanding the challenge of building a network that resists
copyright enforcement. The closer a network comes to a pure P2P
design, the more disparate the targets for copyright infringement
and the greater the threat to a gatekeeper system.
Why not always build the most decentralized design possible?
The general answer is that it is difficult. Indeed, within the technical community, variations from "purity" are so commonplace that
there are healthy debates over what should even be considered a
peer network.125
Pure peer networks are a design challenge because eliminating
intermediaries decreases control over the network. The loss of control makes it difficult to ensure performance on a mass scale, to establish network trust, and even to perform simple tasks like keeping statistics. As networks grow, these problems become more
pronounced. It is simple, in other words, to build a pure P2P network for six friends interested in trading, just as it is simple to
maintain a study group with six members. It is difficult, however, to
make the same design work for ten million people.
In practice, there are four recognized classes of application design. They are pictured in Figures 1 and 2 and are summarized in
Table 2. Figure 1 depicts the two extremes. The Internet's most
important application, the World Wide Web, represents an archeSee, e.g., Gene Kan, Gnutella, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive Technology, supra note 123, at 94, 117 ("[T]he debate ... burning in the technology community... [is] what is truly peer-to-peer."); Clay Shirky, What is P2P...
And What Isn't?, The O'Reilly Networks, at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/p2p/
2000/11/24/shirkyl-whatisp2p.html (Nov. 24, 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (arguing that the label describing what is happening to networks,
"peer-to-peer," does not clarify much).
121
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typal client-server model. "Pure" peer design, meanwhile, is what
the early version of the Gnutella peer filesharing programs
adopted to avoid infringement liability.
It is often useful in a peer design to have at least one central
server in which to store user information, search databases, and
create a system of trust. Such a design forms the "centrally coordinated" peer network, pictured on the right of Figure 2. Napster
used this architecture, as do popular chat programs like AOL Instant Messenger. 26
Figure 2: Hybrid Designs
Hierarchical Peer Network

Centrally Coordinated
Peer Network

Clients

Peer D

Peer B

Peer C

"Email"

"Napster"

To complete the classification, many of the most well-known
networks are hybrids that balance control and decentralization.
They appear to be P2P networks to the end-users but they are actually only P2P between specialized servers. This "hierarchical
peer-to-peer" network, pictured on the left of Figure 2, supports
regular Internet Protocol ("IP") email, the Domain Name System

6

See Nelson Minar et al., A Network of Peers: Peer-to-Peer Models Through the
History of the Internet, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive
Technology, supra note 123, at 3, 17.
"
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("DNS"), and the classic newsreader "USENET.' ' 27 With email, no
central authority controls delivery of messages. Rather, a particular
university's or company's servers communicate with other institutional servers in a P2P fashion.128
Table 2: Types of Network and Examples
Network Type

Example

Client-Server

World Wide Web

Centrally Coordinated Peer

Napster, Instant Messen-

Network

ger

Hierarchical Peer Network

Email, Usenet, DNS

Pure Peer Network

Gnutella

As this discussion shows, what is called a peer network may be
decentralized in only certain respects. Examining the life cycle of a
node in a peer network shows how often intermediaries are needed
to smooth the functioning of even the most basic network. Of
course, every intermediary becomes a potential legal target.
To begin life as a peer node, a user needs to install the appropriate software. This usually means downloading it from an intermediary (typically a web site). The node must find at least one peer to
join the peer network, but how can this location be done without
knowing a peer in advance? Again, the solution is usually reliance
127See

M. Horton & R. Adams, The Internet Eng'g Task Force, Standard for Inter-

change of USENET Messages, at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl036.txt (1987) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (detailing structure of USENET system).
'mSee P. Mockapetris, The Internet Eng'g Task Force, Domain NamesImplementation and Specification, at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt (1987) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (detailing design of domain name system).
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on some intermediary, such as a "host cache," that grants the peer
node one peer address so that the user may begin to use the network.
To be useful, the peer node must have some ability to discover
what content is available on the network. For example, in a network meant to share music, a user needs to know what songs are
actually available, preferably by searching by artist, song title, etc.
The very volume of search traffic thus generated, however, can
strain a network design to the point of collapse.'29 Designers may
minimize this effect if they design the network to access a finite
amount of content (for example, hit songs). Nonetheless, designing
a network remains a fundamental challenge. It is easiest to store
search information in one place, but if search information is centralized, as it is in the Napster design, it creates yet another specialized intermediary.
Finally, peer networks need to provide for connections among
peers. Here, the greatest problems for non-centralized peer models
come from user abuse of anonymity. In a music network, copyright
owners could potentially send around fake files. In network terms,
this is the problem of "trust." Trust systems are difficult, if not impossible, to create without some centralized system of verification.
The preceding description is a summary of the challenges facing
P2P technology. The point is that P2P design represents a serious
challenge for designers because it requires compromise. Fewer intermediaries means fewer targets for an infringement lawsuit. The
existence of fewer intermediaries, however, makes it harder for users to use the system, creates a greater risk of system crashes, and
increases the risk of anonymous attacks. There is a tension between an optimal P2P filesharing network and the goal of avoiding
copyright liability. This condition will bear strongly in the examination of P2P programming incentives. The next Section considers
how P2P designs have sidestepped social norms that might have
prevented copyright infringement.
E. Copyright and Social Norms
According to a 2000 Pew Internet Project study, seventy-eight
percent of those who download music do not consider it to be
129See Kan,

supra note 125, at 112-14.
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stealing and sixty-one percent do not care if the music they
download is copyrighted. 3 ' A survey reported by two economists
showed that only fourteen percent of respondents considered illegal copying of software to be a serious crime, compared to thirty
percent who felt that way about driving forty miles per hour in a
twenty-five miles-per-hour zone.'31 These statistics suggest that P2P
applications have not only undermined copyright's gatekeeper regime, but have also successfully sidestepped social norms that
might otherwise bolster compliance with the copyright regime. This
Section describes how code designers structured their applications
to avoid social norms.
As discussed above, theorists have suggested that the possibility
of state punishment provides an incomplete explanation for observed compliance with societal rules.'32 Rather, they suggest that
other systems of social control, including social norms, account for
compliance.'33 While accounts differ, the arguments contend that
some mix of the threat of external social sanctions,"' the fear of
sending the wrong signals to others, 35' and the internalization of
ethics136 creates compliance that exceeds what would be observed
as a simple reaction to the threat of punishment.
Those who benefit from copyright laws benefit from the norm
that physically stealing a CD or DVD is socially unacceptable.
They are hurt, however, by the norm that makes copying the same
CD at home acceptable. Despite their cosmetic differences, eco-

30See
"

Lenhart et al., supra note 11, at 5.

See Harbaugh & Khemka, supra note 102, at 6.
supra note 26 and accompanying text.

32See

Understanding exactly how norms operate to ensure compliance with legal rules
is beyond the scope of this paper. For a new account of this issue see Mahoney &
Sanchirico, supra note 26, at 41-48 (suggesting that the state's punishments play a role
in sustaining strategies of cooperation with legal rules).
134 A classic external sanction model is provided in Ellickson, supra note 15, at 12426.
"' The signaling theory is presented in Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 765, 766-67 (1998).
"' See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643,
1661-66 (1996) (characterizing internalization as the precondition of a norm's existence).
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nomically speaking, each instance of copying represents approximately the same economic loss in the form of a lost potential sale. 37
Therefore, the system of social norms, like the gatekeeper regime, is an alternative mechanism for creating compliance with a
given legal rule. If norms track the substance of legal rules, it
stands to reason that a rational, widespread effort to reduce the
costs of regulation may sidestep the enforcement of legal rules by
manipulating social norms. If it were considered disgraceful to
download music on the Internet, copyright compliance could be
achieved without active, primary enforcement. The design of P2P
networks, however, successfully exploits the status of copyright
norms, taking full advantage of an existing ambiguity as to whether
home, non-commercial copying is "wrong."
In one of the few disinterested studies of its time, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment conducted a 1989 survey
regarding attitudes toward home copying."8 The study found a
simple norm: people think copying for friends is okay, but copying
for money is wrong.'39 More precisely, it found that large majorities
(sixty-three percent) of consumers considered making a taped copy
of audio materials for a friend to be "acceptable" or "perfectly acceptable."'' 0 On the other hand, the greater majority (seventy-six
percent) found selling copied materials unacceptable. 4' The survey
mirrors widespread anecdotal evidence'42 suggesting a normative
difference between commercial and non-commercial copying.
P2P filesharing exploits this distinction brilliantly. P2P clients
create no sensation or impression of stealing (the absence of this
quality typifies what Professor Strahilevitz would call "charismatic
code" design). 43 Instead, the user is invited to a "community" of
peers who exchange song files. A user, importantly, has no sense
that she is "selling" copyrighted materials. The design therefore
"3Assuming a similar likelihood that the thief or friend would have otherwise paid
the full price for the music.
138See Office of Tech. Assessment, supra note 11, at 139-65.
Id. at 163.

140
Id.

141Id.
142Jessica Litman, for example, argues that in general
people "do not observe copyight rules in their daily behavior," because "people don't believe the copyright law
saps what it does say." Litman, supra note 103, at 111-12.
4 See Strahilevitz, supra
note 12, at 549.
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exploits the distinction between the acceptance of non-commercial
copying and the non-acceptance of commercial copying. While the
economic consequences of peer filesharing could be large, the superficial absence of commercial exchange makes filesharing more
acceptable under the norms of home copying.
Figure 3: The Friendly Face of the BearShare Community
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As an illustrative example, consider the BearShare client pictured above. There is little on the screen to suggest that a user is
engaging in a morally ambiguous operation or is committing an act
of theft. The friendly bear in BearShare is an icon of charismatic
code.
The exploitation of social norms seems to have succeeded in facilitating a robust filesharing community. The 2000 Pew Internet
Project Survey overwhelmingly supports the view that those who
use filesharing networks do not think they are stealing.'" That same
study also suggests that fifty-three percent of all Internet users, and
forty percent of all Americans, think that by sharing music through
the Internet they are not doing anything wrong.'45 Along these
same lines, a 2002 survey by Business Software Alliance found that
only thirty-eight percent of Internet users claimed they would
never download a potentially pirated program to save money.'46 In
'44Lenhart et al., supra note 11, at 5.
141Id. at 6.
'46See Business Software Alliance, Survey Spotlights Growing Problem of Online

Software Piracy, at http://www.bsa.org/resources/2002-05-29.117.pdf (May 29, 2002)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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the end, P2P networks not only exploit the limits of legal enforcement, but also dodge the system of social norms that fortifies the
relevant legal rules.
This Part has demonstrated that the success of P2P depends on
the presence of certain vulnerabilities peculiar to copyright law.
Part III considers the reaction of the beneficiaries of copyright law
and the regulatory competition that followed it.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF P2P DESIGN AND REGULATORY
COMPETITION

The years 1999 to 2003 represented a period of regulatory competition between P2P users and the incumbent industry. At stake
were substantial rents-the monopoly rents obtainable when the
copyright law is enforced. As the succeeding narrative shows, the
two groups had different comparative advantages: one had code;
the other had litigation and legal change. In other words, the competition pitted methods of avoidance against methods of change.
There are two outstanding aspects to this story. The first is the
degree to which code design evolved to better target the weaknesses of the copyright regime. Part II demonstrated that P2P networks were generally designed to target copyright's dependence on
a gatekeeper system and to exploit the lack of clear normative support for the copyright system. This Part will show that the design
evolved to take advantage of a specific legal doctrine-copyright's
contributory liability doctrine-embodied in the decision in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios,147 and elaborated in A
148
& M Records v. Napster.

The second is the nature of the reaction to the P2P network. The
recording industry is obviously the beneficiary of the existing copyright laws, and the erosion of the gatekeeper regime provoked an
investment in various mechanisms of legal change (investments in
efforts to change copyright law). These patterns follow the model
of regulatory competition described in Part I.

147

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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A. Napster and its Predecessors

While Napster was the first laboratory for a peer response, it was
itself a reaction to an earlier model. The very first efforts at mass
distribution of copyrighted materials employed a purely clientserver model-essentially, web sites with songs available for
download. The company "MP3.com," which debuted in 1996, is
one well-known example. Its "My.MP3" service allowed users to
download, among other things, copyrighted MP3 files, provided
they owned the CD that corresponded to the file in question. '
This service effectively gave users remote access to music that they
already owned.
The architecture of My.MP3 and other web-based services, not
the fair-use issue, is of particular interest here. 5 ° My.MP3 relied on
a pure client-server model. It placed a huge amount of copyrighted
material in a single space. When the recording industry sued, the
company's activities were deemed clearly illegal under the traditional model of copyright enforcement. '' The recording industry's
case was not much different, enforcement-wise, from the Elvis
bootleggers in Dowling v. United States' 2-both were large, centralized copiers of copyrighted materials.
Other sources of copyrighted sounds in the early 1990s were the
primitive, anonymous websites that simply made MP3s available
for download. 3 But these sites faced two serious technological
problems. First, if a site became popular it would quickly become
overburdened with user traffic. Second, there were few reliable and
straightforward means for finding such sites."'

"'See Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 192 (2001).
"' Because MP3.com required users to own the CD for the MP3s they were given
the right to download, there was a good argument that MP3.com's copying of the files
to facilitate "space-shifting" was fair use. See id. at 193-94.
See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
152473 U.S. 207 (1985).
"5 See Bruce Haring, You can't stop the music on the Net: Recording industry debates MP3 piracy issue, USA Today, Nov. 4, 1998, at 5D, available at 1998 WL
5740934 (noting the "abundance of sites both legal and illegal").
"' For example, the website MP3Board offered a search engine for such sites and
was quickly sued. See MP3Board v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. C-0020606RMW, 2001 WL 804502, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2001) (staying a California
countersuit).
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Then came Napster. The beta version of Napster debuted on
June 1, 1999. Napster's revolutionary design was a response to the
legal and technical problems of the web-based companies. As one
commentator noted, "[Napster] was written to solve a problem[legal] limitations on file copying."'55
Napster eliminated the intermediary that had doomed My.MP3
and others. It designed a network that decentralized the infringing
content, leaving the songs on the hard drives of individual home
users. Napster differentiated itself from the traditional commercial
copyright pirate by styling itself as a place to trade music rather
than as a place to sell or distribute it.
Napster, however, was not completely decentralized. Napster's
programmers, Shawn Fanning and Jordan Ritter, were also aware
of the challenge to P2P networks of operating on a mass scale.56
Napster mixed client-server and peer elements in order to make
the search for songs a fast and scalable solution. Hence, the Napster server facilitated both database searching and brokering of
individual connections.
The design scaled impeccably. While estimates vary, at its height,
Napster had tens of millions of active users, an astonishing technological accomplishment.'57 But the failure to remove itself as an intermediary with control over parts of the process made Napster,
the company, a target for an infringement lawsuit. That lawsuit
came on December 6,1999.158

The infringement case against Napster boiled down to a question
of control, intimately connected to the network design questions
studied here. The situation would have been different if Napster
had been a form of multi-purpose copying technology over which
Napster itself had no specific power. This relationship between
technology and ownership would have put Napster in the same position as cameras, VCRs, and other forms of "copying equipment"

' Shirky,

156

supra note 125, at 28.
See Jordan Ritter, Why Gnutella Can't Scale. No, Really., at http://www.

darkridge.com/-jpr5/doc/gnutella.html (Feb. 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing scaling problems in P2P networks).
1'See Healey, supra note 93.
See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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described in Sony Corp. of America v. UniversalCity Studios.15 9 The
makers of VCRs and photocopiers obviously know that their products are often used to infringe copyright, but since they are powerless to do anything about these violations and because the equipment has substantial non-infringing uses, they are not made
liable."
Napster's argument-that it was a mere instrument of both legal
and illegal uses-was belied by its design. One overriding factual
finding doomed the company: The court found that "[Napster]
could block access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material."'61
This fact made Napster the sponsor, rather than just the instrument, of infringing conduct. Instead of a VCR, Napster's design
put it in the classic position of the dance hall that chooses to allow
an infringing artist to play despite having the power to stop the
performance. 62 The Sony Court itself declared that when a defendant is "in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by
others," the "imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just."'63
After the court found that Napster exercised control, holding it
to be both a contributory and a vicarious infringer was easy. Napster's design allowed the record industry to use the "notice and
failure to remove" formula to prove knowledge (an element of
contributory copyright infringement)."6 The record industry sent
'

464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) ("[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other

articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.").
"The Sony Court described this as the "staple article of commerce doctrine." Id.
161A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). See also id.
at 1023 ("The district court correctly determined that Napster had the right and ability to police its system.").
'The classic dance hall case is Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,
36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding a dance hall liable for copyright infringement
because they hired an infringing orchestra to supply music to paying customers). In
contrast, landlords have traditionally not been held liable for the infringements of
their tenants. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (refusing to
hold a landlord liable for the copyright infringement committed by a tenant on the
premises).
163 Sony, 464 U.S.
at 437.
' Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. This formula has become the favored technique for
proving knowledge in service provider cases. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing
actual knowledge to be demonstrated in this manner).
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Napster notice of thousands of infringing files available through
the system and then proved that these files remained available for
download.165
On the issue of vicarious liability, the decisive legal question also
involved Napster's degree of control. As the appeals court framed
it, the question was whether Napster had "the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also ha[d] a direct financial interest in such activities. ' , 166 Napster's architecture again provided an
answer. As the court
noted, "Napster retains the right to control
1 67
access to its system.
This ruling led Napster to bankruptcy "' and also taught several
legal lessons to P2P code designers. As the late Gene Kan, a postNapster developer, wrote, "[T]he recording industry.., is sensitizing software developers and technologists to the legal ramifications
of their inventions. Napster looked like a pretty good idea a year
ago, but today Gnutella and Freenet look like much better
ideas. 1 9 Napster taught peer network designers that both lack of
control and general functionality had to be comprehensive and
credible to avoid contributory liability. The relationship between
developers and peer networks needed to be more like that between
Xerox and its photocopiers. The response, Napster suggested,
should take the form of a protocol rather than an application.
Email and Usenet had never been sued for copyright infringement,
despite their widespread use for illegal purposes. The lesson was
simple-Napster had not gone far enough.
There was a flurry of attempts to succeed Napster; many so
technologically unsuccessful (Napigator) or so clearly liable under
Napster (Scour) as to be unworthy of discussion. Over the years
1999-2002 there were approximately fifty-eight different filesharing
clients released to the market.' Of those, only four or five have
6

Napster,239 F.3d at 1022.

'6Id.at 1022 n.6.
167Id.

at 1023.

"6The Ninth Circuit's ruling on the preliminary injunction was the effective, but not
the formal, end of the litigation over Napster. See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc.,
284 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court's preliminary injunction).
169Kan, supra note 125, at 121.
17 The compiled list of filesharing clients from 1999-2002 includes: Abe's MP3
finder, Aimster (now named Madster), Ares, Audio-Galaxy, AudioGnome, BadBlue,
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enjoyed lasting significance.' One successor was different. It was
founded on concepts of radical decentralization and was clearly designed to avoid the copyright lawsuit that had befallen Napster.
That successor was the protocol named Gnutella.
B. Early Gnutella: 2000-2001
"Before [Gnutella], systems were centralized and boring."'72
Gnutella was a child of the open-source movement. Its unusual
name, non-linear development origins, and relative difficulty of use
are all hallmarks of an open-source work product."3 Gnutella delivered a radically decentralized design that made it a darling of
academic study. The design was an intentional effort to create a
filesharing protocol that could avoid a lawsuit. Although it succeeded, it did so at the expense of social and scalability problems.
Gnutella's decentralization was nearly absolute. No single node
on the early Gnutella network was different than any other.
Searching, file transferring, and peer finding were all accomplished
without the creation of specialized intermediaries. The only identifiable intermediaries were those relatively limited sites that made
the early Gnutella client (version 0.56) available for download.
Gnutella developers compare the network they designed to a
cocktail party where users trade files with whomever happens to be
BearShare, Blubster, CuteMX.Com, DirectConnect, eDonkey, FileAngel, Filetopia,
File Navigator, File Rogue, FileSpree, Free Haven, Freenet, Frost, Gnotella, Gnucleus, Gnutella 0.56, Gnutmeg, Grokster, Groove Network, Hotline Communications,
iMesh, iSwipe, Junge Monkey, KaZaA, KonSpire, Limewire, Mactella, Mojo Nation,
Morpheus, MyNapster, Myster, NapMX, Napster, Nutella, Ohaha, OnSystem, OpenNap, Phex, Phosphor, Pointera, Publius, Qtella, Qube, Scour.com, Shareaza, Spinfrenzy, SongSpy, Taxee, Voodoo Vision, WinMX, Xolox. Of course, many of these
are clients for the same networks, as in the multiple GnutellaNet and FastTrack clients.
171In focusing on the major developments, some might argue that I have shortchanged programs like Scour.com and Aimster in the process.
172

Kan, supra note 125.

1 Gnutella was released in March of 2000. It was invented by Justin Frankel
and
Tom Pepper, two programmers working for AOL's Nullsoft. Id. at 95. AOL quashed
the effort, but Gnutella's cause was picked up by the open-source movement. See
Andy Oram, Gnutella and Freenet Represent True Technological Innovation, at
http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/208 (May 5, 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Gnutella's full development followed (and still follows) the nonlinear path characteristic of open-source code. Id.
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nearby.174 The design implements the idea that "Gnutella is not a
program, it is a protocol.'' 15 In other words, Gnutella's designers
created a filesharing network-GnutellaNet-that was unowned
and uncontrolled and to which various Gnutella programs could
provide access. The relationship between the application and the
network was similar to that between various email programs (Eudora, Microsoft Outlook, Hotmail) and the one-serves-all email
network that cannot be said to be owned by anyone. GnutellaNet
was designed as a general filesharing network capable of sharing
any computer file. 76
Gnutella was a success on the legal front. Gnutella's radical decentralization avoided the legal liability that had plagued Napster.
To date, neither GnutellaNet nor its main application designers
have been sued, 177 despite the substantial volume of infringement
they facilitate.
The early GnutellaNet, however, was plagued by stability and
performance problems attributable to its decentralized design. In
late July of 2000, the Gnutella network underwent its first major
crash, leaving the network unusable for more than a month. 8 The
2000 crash was the first sign that the early Gnutella client design
had traded resistance to litigation for system instability.
174See

Kan, supra note 125, at 97-98.

...
From Strategic Vision to a 10-Point Tactical Plan: A followup to The Revolution
Will Be Webcast (working paper), at http://economicdemocracy.org/counterspinner.
html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
176 This characteristic was even more evident in another network, FreeNet, aimed at
achieving the goals of the World Wide Web (storage of information) in a decentralized, purely P2P fashion. A discussion of the methods used by FreeNet can be found
in Ian Clarke et al., Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System, in Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability 46 (Hannes Federrath ed.,
2001); see also Adam Langley, Freenet, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a
Disruptive Technology, supra note 123, at 123 (describing the development and structure of Freenet).
' It is true that Morpheus switched to Gnutella after it was sued as one of the three
FastTrack companies, but no Gnutella developer qua Gnutella developer has been
sued.
"' See Steve McCannell, The Second Coming of Gnutella, WebReview (Mar. 2,
2000), at http://www.webreview.com/mmedia/2001/03_0201.shtml (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association) (detailing reasons for the crash). Interestingly, the
crash came directly in the wake of the Napster injunction as thousands of Napster users attempted to migrate to Gnutella. Id. The crash provided a dramatic demonstration of the difference in scaling capabilities between the two approaches.
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Commentators quickly diagnosed the problem.'79 Early GnutellaNet's stability relied on users' willingness to donate both bandwidth and music files to a common cause and to limit judiciously
their own use of the network. Once a certain number of users
joined the network, stark differences in user bandwidth and the
lack of a central mechanism for allocating traffic to more capable
users made a crash inevitable. While some touted the theoretical
scaling capabilities of Gnutella," ° the instability of early GnutellaNet was undeniable. In addition to the scaling problem, there
were also "social" problems. There was no incentive (not even social incentives, given the anonymous nature of the network) to act
selflessly. A 2000 Xerox/PARC study established that almost seventy percent of Gnutella users shared no files and that nearly fifty
percent of all responses were returned by the top one percent of
sharing hosts.' While this did not necessarily matter if the goal was
trading the 100 most popular songs, Napster's deeper appeal had
been the range of content it made available. The lack of any
mechanism to police selfishness in Gnutella compromised the potential of the common solution.
The problems of Gnutella 2000 were generally recognized, 2 yet
Gnutella's failures were not the end of the peer filesharing response. The crashes and instability led to a new generation of peer
filesharing software. These new-generation programs, bearing
names such as KaZaA, Grokster, Morpheus, and BearShare, are,
for now, the latest chapter of the peer response story.

"' See id; Matei Ripeanu, Peer-to-Peer Architecture Case Study: Gnutella Network,
at http://www.cs.uchicago.edu/files/tr-authenticrR-2001-26.pdf (last visited Mar. 20,
2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing Gnutella's scaling problems); Ritter, supra note 156; See also Hong, supra note 123, at 206-07 (summarizing a now unavailable Clip2 study of the crash). A network engineer would
diagnose the problem as follows: Gnutella's layer 7 topology did not map carefully to
the physical network, meaning the network failed to make use of available resources.
" Gene Kan, for example, argued that Gnutella would scale perfectly well, and that
the 2000 crash was caused by an inappropriate add-on technology. Kan, supra note
125, at 109-17.
'' Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, 5 First Monday
10 (Oct. 2000), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_lO/adar/index.html (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).
' See Hong, supra note 123, at 206-07; McCannell, supra note 178; Ripeanu, supra
note 179.
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C. The KaZaA Era: 2001-Present
The legal vulnerabilities of Napster and the stability and social
problems of Gnutella inspired a new approach. Led by the enigmatic KaZaA, and its FastTrack engine, a new generation of peersharing applications tried to strike a balance between suability and
scalability. Unlike the original Gnutella, they allowed some hierarchy and made some effort to engineer polite behavior. At the same
time, they tried to avoid the centralized control that doomed Napster. The results are programs of great sophistication, attuned carefully to the doctrines of copyright.
The new generation reintroduced hierarchy among users. They
created a distinction between "regular peers" and "superpeers"
based on detected resources-in particular, bandwidth."a3 In this hierarchy, college students are on top: high bandwidth users (college
students on university networks, home DSL, and cable users) are
superpeers, while dial-up users (home modem users) are regular
peers.
Dozens of programs grew into the technological gap between
Napster and Gnutella. Only a few, however, reached mass scale for
any length of time."
1. FastTrackand KaZaA
FastTrack returned filesharing to an enterprise of substantial
scale. In late 2001, the FastTrack network grew to be the largest
filesharing network since Napster, with an average of two to four
million users online at any given time.'85 Dutch programmers Niklas Zennstrom and Janus Friis created the FastTrack protocol late
in 2000 and wrote a client application, KaZaA, to access the FastTrack network.'86 Unlike Gnutella, the protocol was never released

183Names

vary: BearShare groups users into "ultrapeers" and "leafs." See Bear-

Share, Gnutella Good Citizen Tips, at http://www.bearshare.com/help/citizen.htm
(last visited Feb. 9, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
1 Some of the more major programs from this period not discussed here include
Audio-Galaxy, Aimster (now named Madster), WinMX, iMesh, and OpenNAP.
"' This number is based on Active Users Statistics, at http://www.slyck.com/
index.php (July 22-Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
'8 Kevin Maney, Fight over digital music filesharing keeps getting weirder, USA
Today, Sept. 25, 2002, at B3.

When Code Isn't Law

2003]

735

as an open-source standard. 7 Instead, KaZaA insisted that companies pay to access the FastTrack network. The companies Grokster and Morpheus"' did so, creating several client alternatives.
The FastTrack companies fit somewhere between early Gnutella
and Napster in their elimination of intermediaries. The protocol
borrows heavily from Gnutella. It also maintains the distinction between the protocol and the clients; the company KaZaA, for instance, maintains no power to "shut down" the network.'89
FastTrack deviates from the pure design of early Gnutella in
several significant ways. First, it implements a very sophisticated
system of superpeering designed to avoid scaling problems. This
system has been a success. The KaZaA superpeer system, from
user accounts, produces much better performance than even the
next-generation Gnutella clients." Such tiering, however, means
that not all users are equal; a finite number of superpeers do the
bulk of the work.
Second, the FastTrack companies have, like Napster, centralized
several functions. A central server is still responsible for maintaining user registrations, logging users in to the system (in order to
maintain statistics), and helping the process of finding peers in the
first place. As previously discussed, efficient operation is difficult
to maintain in the face of radical decentralization. 9' Third, at least
one of the FastTrack companies (KaZaA) promotes selfless behavior by sharing user files without telling the user. A 2002 Hewlett
Packard study demonstrated that the KaZaA client made it diffi-

' It has been reverse-engineered by several groups, who create clients that access
the FastTrack network without permission. A prominent example is giFT (giFT isn't
FastTrack). See generally What is the giFT project?, at http://gift.sourceforge.net/
docs.php?document=whatis.html (Sept. 14, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing giFT and OpenFT).
8 See Benny Evangelista, Morpheus software morphing: Maker of filesharing program to put limits on MP3 swapping, S.F. Chron., Mar. 14, 2002, at B1. Morpheus
later reverted to Gnutella, after licensing disagreements with KaZaA. See id.
"' See Amy Harmon, Music Industry in Global Fight on Web Copies, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 7, 2002, at Al.
'9 See, e.g., Morpheus 2.0-Revisited, Slyck, at http://www.slyck.com/newsaug2002/
081902b.html (Aug. 19, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(discussing loss of performance when Morpheus switched from FastTrack to Gnutella

network).
191See

supra text accompanying notes 172-82.
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cult to know what files users were sharing.'92 The study demonstrated that many users were sharing all of the files on their computers, but were totally unaware of that fact.'93 Increasing the number of shared files, of course, improves the performance of the
network.
Finally, the FastTrack companies also adopted another avoidance strategy-jurisdictional exit.' 94 KaZaA's parent is incorporated in Vanuatu, a group of islands in the South Pacific noted for
its lack of a copyright law. Grokster maintains its servers in Nevis,
a thirty-six square mile nation-state in the West Indies. Only Morpheus resides in the United States.'95
2. Next-Generation Gnutella
GnutellaNet, meanwhile, continued to operate on a smaller
scale. Recall that neither GnutellaNet nor any Gnutella client has
ever been sued-their problems are instead self-generated.
Gnutella responded to its scaling and social problems by adopting
a superpeer design similar to that of FastTrack. The best known of
the new GnutellaNet developers are BearShare and Limewire.
Both compromise a purely decentralized design of equal users by
distinguishing between high- and low-bandwidth users and by giving the former more duties.
The continued growth of Gnutella was marked by a lack of coordination among developers. As Kelly Truelove writes, "Unfortunately, Gnutella has a history of aborted, failed or poorly supported attempts to unite
developers; the analogy of herding cats
196
has rarely been so apt.'
Major Gnutella clients have also taken measures to "engineer
good behavior." For example, BearShare and Limewire block re-

"'Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability and privacy: a study of Kazaa
P2P file-sharing, HP Laboratories, at http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL2002-163.pdf (June 5, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
193Id.
"4 See Harmon, supra note 189, at Al.
See id.
Kelly Truelove, Gnutella: Alive, Well, and Changing Fast, OpenP2P.com, at
http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2001/O1/25/trueloveOlOl.html?page=2 (Jan. 25,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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197
quests from clients who do not contribute files to GnutellaNet.
These efforts, as was the case with the FastTrack companies, may
make these clients easier to sue because they suggest an increased
quantum of "control" over the Gnutella network.
Finally, despite the change, Gnutella still appears to have scaling
problems. Statistics kept by Limewire show that, during the first
half of 2002, the network size rarely reached more than 500,000. 19
By July 2002, GnutellaNet had declined to an average of 160,000
nodes. 19' Gnutella experts point to the same general problem: no
control over selfish behavior. An anonymous source at Limewire
explained the problem: "Client 'A' may excessively query (hammer) three or more UltraPeers. While this may produce plentiful
results, the overall affect [sic] on the network is negative as it slows
queries from more reasonable clients."2 0 These concerns show the
continuing difficulty in balancing decentralization and selfless behavior. Yet the fact that GnutellaNet remains unsued endows it
with an aura of continued importance in the filesharing story.

D. FastTrackand Gnutella Go to Court
On October 2, 2001, the music industry sued Grokster, Morpheus, and KaZaA: the three principal FastTrack companies. '
This ongoing lawsuit is a signal test of the viability of designing
code to avoid legal liability. Programmers wrote FastTrack and
Gnutella to exploit loopholes left by the Napster decision. The
case, styled Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, asks
whether the P2P programmers have succeeded. The initial answer
is yes.
The music industry's complaint made every effort to stress the
similarity between Napster and KaZaA and the other FastTrack
197Namely, the clients Gnute and Gnutella.it allowed users simply to use GnutellaNet to download files. See id.
' Gnutella's Decline, Slyck, at http://www.slyck.com/newsjuly2002/071702a.htm
(July 17, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
9 Id.

2

0

Id.

for Damages and Injunctive Relief for Copyright Infringement at 2, 8,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 2003 WL 186657 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2003)
(No. Civ.01-08541) (seeking damages and injunctive relief for copyright infringement), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/KaZaA-Complaint.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
201Complaint
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companies. Once again it accused the companies of creating "a 21st
century piratical bazaar., 212 It noted that the defendants grant access to "a closed computer network, controlled by Defendants." 203
It also put emphasis on the fact that communications are centrally
encrypted.2 ' The complaint highlights these facts to support the argument that the FastTrack companies, like
Napster, "are capable
25
of controlling the activities of their users. 1
But the facts did not support this contention (by design). District
Judge Stephen Wilson, granting summary judgment in favor of
Grokster and Morpheus, 2°6 refused to buy the comparison to Napster (the program). The opinion suggests that the changes in design
"worked," at least with respect to negating the element of control
that sealed Napster's fate.
Just as in Napster, the court took the issue of control as the sine
qua non of contributory liability. As the court put it: "[T]he critical
question is whether [defendants] do anything, aside from distributing software, to actively facilitate-or whether they could do anything to stop-their users' infringing activity."2 7 It was here that
the changes in design made a difference. Judge Wilson pointed out,
in a crucial factual holding:
Neither StreamCast nor Grokster facilitates the exchange of files
between users in the way Napster did. Users connect to the respective networks, select which files to share, send and receive
searches, and download files, all with no material involvement of
Defendants. If either Defendant closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products
could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.0

202Id. at 2.

...
Id. (seeking damages and injunctive relief for copyright infringement).
""Id. at 2-3.
211Id. at 10.
206See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
F. Supp. 2d_, 2003
WL 1989129 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2003). Default judgment was entered against a shell
company named KaZaA BV, holding no relevant assets, who declined to defend the
lawsuit. See id. at 4 n.2. Sharman Networks, the current operator of the KaZaA system, was not a party to the motions. See id. at 6.
207 Id. at 19.
200Id. at 23-24.

2003]

When Code Isn't Law

739

As noted above, Gnutella and FastTrack embody a selfconscious effort to make P2P filesharing more like the VCR or
photocopier. And the court accepted just that rationale, concluding, "Grokster and StreamCast are not significantly different from
companies that sell home video recorders or copy machines, both
of which can be and are used to infringe copyrights., 2°9 Hence, "absent evidence of active and substantial contribution to the in21
fringement itself, Defendants cannot be liable.""
Will the judgment survive appeal? There are reasons to suspect
it will not. The district court's decision ultimately depends on Sony
as interpreted by Napster. Sony, in turn, can be read as a policy
judgment aimed principally at correcting a perceived market failure. 21 ' While clearer in hindsight, it is apparent that the Sony decision correctly addressed a market failure. 12 The VCR broadened
the addressable market for television shows (via time-shifting) and
for movies (via rentals). Though there is an argument that filesharing helps the music industry, the desirability of the "help" is much
less apparent. 2 13 Filesharing looks more like a replacement for legitimate music sales; such reasoning may compel a court to find
some way to assess liability on P2P developers regardless of the
Napster precedent. In addition, the ratio of infringing to noninfringing use must be at the forefront of the ultimate policy judgment in this area. If the alleged non-infringing uses retain their de
minimis character the court of appeals will presumably feel that
there is little consequence in ruling against the P2P filesharing
companies.
Perhaps the only policy reason to think otherwise is an institutional argument. Ultimate settlement of the filesharing dispute, the
argument goes, is a task for Congress; and a decision against the

'09
210 Id.

at 27.
Id.
"' See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982)
(describing fair use as a mechanism for correcting market failure).
212See id.; see also Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster:
Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility Of Coasean Bargaining,
26 U. Dayton L. Rev. 247, 260-63 (2001) (giving the basic economic argument that
Napster be held liable and suggesting Coasean complications).
2 For studies supporting this position, see Chipman, supra note 98; Lahey, supra
note 98.
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copyright owners will force such settlement. Such "settlementforcing" decisions in copyright have a long pedigree, from the 1908
piano-roll case White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,214
to the cable-broadcast decisions of the 1960s and 1970s.215 Both
prompted Congressional action to settle a dispute between an incumbent and challenger technology.216 Judge Wilson clearly had
this in mind, writing "[w]hile the Court need not decide whether
steps could be taken to reduce the susceptibility of such software to
unlawful use.., additional legislative guidance may be wellcounseled., 217 It remains to be seen whether the courts of appeals
will think that trying to force settlement of copyright disputes remains an appropriate court function.
E. The Reaction to the Reaction
The recording industry's reactions to P2P filesharing are a paradigm for understanding the modern face of regulatory competition.
As preceding Sections have shown, the filesharer's comparative
advantage lay in designing code to avoid copyright law. The recording industry, meanwhile, has invested in a broader range of
mechanisms to influence law and its effects. The content industry
invested in changing the law (by controlling access, increasing intermediary liability, and increasing criminal liability), in changing
social norms, and in changing code to attack P2P networks. The extent of increased investment can be seen from the annual increases
in the budget of the RIAA itself. In the early 1990s, the RIAA's
budget was estimated at $10 million. 21' By 1995, the RIAA was
spending $14.7 million. By 2000, the budget had tripled to $39 million and in 2001 stood at $44 million. 219

209 U.S. 1 (1908).
See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
6 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (cable and mechanical compulsory licenses).
27 Grokster, F.Supp. 2d- at 33.
218 See Bill Holland, Tougher RIAA gives pirates chase but still running uphill, Bill214
215

Board, Mar. 14, 1992, available at 1992 WL 11645300.
219 See Bill Holland, Performers Give Testimony Before Judges And Lawmakers,
BillBoard, Sept. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24692410.
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1. Investments in Change

The recording industry's investments in legal change are most
prominent. In the 1990s, the content industry invested considerable
time and energy to ensure the passage of three critical laws to but-

tress copyright enforcement: the anti-circumvention provisions of
the DMCA, 220the ISP-liability sections of that same bill, 22' and the
enhancement of copyright's criminal penalties in the No Electronic
Theft ("NET") Act.222
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA reinforce various technological techniques of.preventing copying by criminalizing circumvention of copy protection systems. 23 The provisions can
be understood as an effort to restore an eroding gatekeeper system. Technological copy protection "respecializes" the creation
and mass distribution of copyrighted works, while the DMCA's
anti-circumvention law makes it a crime to undo the respecializa-

tion.12' The law can be understood as an effort to return content
owners to the 1970s, when they were free to sit back and police the
few intermediaries licensed to access the copy-protected content. 5
The anti-circumvention provisions are usually discussed in conjunction with the much-discussed possibility of effective digital rights
management. 6 Some have speculated that there may be a future
where content owners manage to encrypt content so carefully and
comprehensively from the outset, and maintain their control continuously, that the code prevents infringement ex ante. 7 Such ef22'17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).

2"
2 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
2 No Electronic Theft (NET)

Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codi-

fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (2000)).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
22 A more recent example in the same vein is the well-known "Hollings
Bill." Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002).
The bill would require all "digital media devices" to include copy protection technology in their designs. Id. § 5(a). It can be otherwise described as an effort to place the
burden of preventing copyright infringement on electronics manufacturers.
2' It is worth briefly noting, however, that there is a problem with the DMCA strategy as a response to filesharing. Unless completely successful in blocking access, digital protection schemes can simply make legal, protected products even less attractive
than the competitors available through filesharing networks.
6
See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 149, at 177-99; see also Raymond Ku, The Creative
Destruction Of Copyright: Napster And The New Economics Of Digital Technology,
69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 275-76 (2002) (describing digital rights management systems).
22 See Lessig, supra note 149, at 177-99.
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forts remain in their early stages and are highly speculative, but
they would eventually transform the economics of copyright enforcement.22
The ISP-specific sections of the DMCA, Section 512 et seq., represent the culmination of an effort to replace the lost intermediaries of times past with ISPs. There have been a few attempts to use
these sections to target filesharing. In the summer of 2002, the
RIAA filed a lawsuit against various telephone companies who operate the backbone of the Internet, based on their failure to contain overseas copyright infringement, but it dropped the suit a
week later. 29 More recently, using a different section of the
DMCA, the RIAA successfully convinced a federal judge to require Verizon to identify a subscriber accused of downloading
hundreds of copyrighted files in a single day.23
Finally, the efforts to pass the NET Act of 1997 and subsequent
lobbying represent an effort to turn to the criminal side of copyright to enhance primary enforcement. Under the little-noticed
NET Act, the federal government may criminally prosecute relatively minor copyright infringements. While this criminal statute
still requires "private financial gain," the NET Act defines "financial gain" to include "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything
of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works., 232 This
definition makes quid pro quo filetrading potentially criminal.
Copyright owners have mounted an effort to convince the Justice Department to enforce the NET Act against individual peer
filesharers 33 This amounts to an attempt to increase the sanction,
if not the probability of detection, for copyright infringement. The
228 Cf.

Ku, supra note 226, at 275-76 (arguing against copyright protection for digital

works because the economics of digital technology undercuts prior assumptions about
the efficacy of a private property regime for information).
229Alex Pham, Tactics Toughen on Music Piracy, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 2002, at Cl;
Alex Pham, Technology RIAA Drops Suit Targeting Piracy Site, L.A. Times, Aug.
22, 2002, at C5.
23 In re Verizon Internet Services, No. Civ.A.02-MS-0323, 2003 WL 141147 (D.D.C.
Jan. 21, 2003).
21117 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506 (2000).
232 Id. § 101.
23See Benny Evangelista, Casting a wider net: Recording industry may target individuals in online piracy battles, S.F. Chron., Aug. 22, 2002, at El, available at 2002
WL 4028698 (recounting efforts to have the Justice Department enforce the criminal
side of copyright law).
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untested question remains whether either criminal or civil primary
enforcement will be effective in deterring illegal P2P filesharing,
given the limits of primary enforcement in producing deterrence.
2. ExtralegalInvestments
In addition to legal changes, the recording industry has also invested in trying to change the social norms surrounding copyright
infringement and has made some efforts to combat P2P filesharing
directly. As discussed above,235 when it comes to copying files, people have proven to be unaffected by the ethical tug of the copyright
statute. The software and recording industries have spent a decade
trying to change that attitude. The RIAA's "Sound-Byting" campaign, for example, is an investment to try to change the attitudes
of college students toward copyright infringement. The central
message of this campaign is: "[U]ploading and downloading somebody else's music without their permission isn't just against the law.
It's a rip-off. Simple as that." 236 Hilary Rosen, the President of the
RIAA, even participated in a well-publicized public debate at Oxford, arguing that illegal filesharing is immoral.3 As the statistics
cited here and the Pew Internet Project Study discussed above indicate,2 31it is unclear whether these efforts have had much success
in changing public attitudes toward filesharing.
Perhaps most interestingly, content owners may also be taking a
page from the book of P2P designers themselves, using code to influence the enforcement of copyright law by attacking the P2P networks that undermine copyright enforcement. Reports on the use
of attacks on P2P networks are hard to verify. There are several
methods, however, through which content owners might try to
disable P2P networks. One method seeks to decrease the attrac2 See Lisa M. Bowman, File-traders in the crosshairs, CNET News, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-943881.html (July 15, 2002) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) (reporting that the recording industry is considering a program of lawsuits against end-users).
33'
See discussion supra Section II.E.
236See Soundbyting Home Page, at http://www.soundbyting.com/html/who we-are/
are index.html (last visited July 24, 2002).
"See Matt Bai, Hating Hilary, Wired 11.02 (Feb. 2003), at http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/11.02/hating-pr.html (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
238
See supra text accompanying note 130.
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tiveness of P2P networks, often by flooding the network with
dummy or broken music files. 239 Users then must spend more time
looking for good files, increasing the attractiveness of conventional
distribution channels. Another method, albeit one that is probably
illegal under the computer crimes laws, would simply attack important network nodes using techniques familiar to computer hackers. 24 More fanciful examples of this type of strategy include that of
a virus designed to detect illegally copied materials.24 ' The extent to

which these methods are used today is a carefully guarded secret.242
The continued activity of peer filesharing networks, however, suggests either limited success or limited usage of such techniques.
On June 25, 2002, Representative Howard Berman of North
Hollywood, California proposed that "[t]echnological self-help"
should help provide the solution to "unbridled" peer network piracy. 43 He proposed a bill that would give legal license for copyright owners to disrupt peer networks. 4 Representative Berman
phrased his support of the bill, interestingly, in terms of "freedom
to respond":
[W]hile P2P technology is free to innovate new and more efficient methods of distribution that further exacerbate the piracy
problem, copyright owners are not equally free to craft techno239For

an entertaining account of how anonymity can be used against peer networks,

see Doug Lichtman & David Jacobson, Anonymity a double-edged sword for pirates
on-line, Chi. Trib., Apr. 13, 2000, at 25.
0 For example, the industry might employ agents to bombard or flood important
P2P nodes with an overload of traffic. This technique is usually described as a "denial
of service" attack. Problematically, such conduct is probably illegal under the laws of
many states. See Neal Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev.
1003, 1017-19 (2001) (collecting state computer crime statutes).
241See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 Yale L.J. 1093, 10981100 (1996) (presenting the hypothetical of a program that roamed the net searching
for contraband).
242See generally Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, Wired 11.02 (Feb. 2003), at
http://www.wired.com./wired/archive/ll.02/kazaa-pr.html (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) (surveying methods of technological self-help).
243Press Release, Representative Howard Berman, Berman Announces Legislation
To Foil Peer To Peer Piracy, at http://www.house.gov/berman/pr062502.htm (June 25,
2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
244To amend Title 17, United States Code, to limit the liability of copyright owners
for protecting their works on peer-to-peer networks: Hearing on H.R. 5211 Before
the House, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
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logical responses. This is not fair and I believe Congress should
free copyright creators to develop and deploy technological tools
to address P2P piracy.2 5
The Berman bill, while unlikely to pass, shows the dramatic extent
and even creativity of efforts to gain advantage in the regulatory
competition surrounding copyright.
The story of the competition between the RIAA and P2P users
delivers a snapshot of the future of understanding compliance and
legal effects. A law's meaning and effects, success or failure, seem
ever less a function of drafting or enforcement. Rather, the question is what forces-social, economic, technological or otherwisemay be recruited for or against the cause.
IV. THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF P2P FILESHARING
"As the largest grassroots effort in the history of the world, file
trading is essentially the average
person's way of saying we don't
246
agree with the status quo.,
Over the last four years, P2P networks have provided a subgroup of media consumers with the equivalent of a temporary repeal of copyright laws for the technologically inclined. How can
one explain the growth and popularity of the peer filesharing
movement? This final Part analyzes the particular fit between P2P
filesharing and its beneficiaries. It shows first, that P2P may represent the rational exploitation of the larger group of music consumers by a subset of computer savvy P2P users, and second, that peer
filesharing uniquely suited the disorganized nature of copyright
consumers as a group.
A. Copyright'sDivided Subjects
One reason P2P filesharing may have been successful is because
users rationally exploited "regular" consumers who lack the
knowledge or resources to use P2P networks. In the standard (if
245Press Release, supra note
2'6Richard Menta, RIAA

243.
and MPAA sue Morpheus, Grokster and KaZaa,

MP3newswire.net, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/sue-morpheus.html
(Oct. 3, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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sometimes disputed) account, copyright law is said to serve the interests of content consumers.247 The law provides financial and, debatably, expressive incentives to create materials that would otherwise not exist. If this is right, why would consumers ever want to
disobey copyright law?
The intuitive answer is that everyone likes getting things for free,
but the answer from economic theory is more enlightening. While
complying with some form of copyright law may serve the collective interest of consumers, it is not in any given individual's interest
to comply. More generally, the logic of collective action suggests
that the ideal strategy for an individual or sub-group under copyright law is to create a system that limits evasion of copyright to an
"in-group," leaving everyone else to pay for the incentives to create. To defect while others remain in compliance is to live in the
game theorist's version of utopia.
In the mid-to-late 1990s, an important demographic trend favored the development of just such a strategy. Social commentators began to use the term "digital divide"2"8 to refer to the factconfirmed by empirical study-that there was a sharp division between a relatively small number of computer literate, connected
citizens and the rest of Americans. In 1998, for instance, the Clinton Administration found that college-educated Americans were
almost ten times more likely to own a computer than those without

" Whether copyright does indeed encourage creative expression is a question beyond the scope of this study of response. I therefore do not address the position held
by some that copyright retards the creation of content. For examples of such positions
see, e.g., Eben Moglen, Liberation Musicology, The Nation, Mar. 12, 2001, at 5; Mark
S. Nadel, Questioning The Economic Justification For (and Thus Constitutionality of)
Copyright Law's Prohibition Against Unauthorized Copying: § 106 (unpublished
manuscript), at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/Nadel.pdf (Jan. 2003) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association); cf. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,
84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970) (questioning whether granting copyrights in books and
computer programs is really necessary to provide incentives to create and publish
them).
248The question of who coined the term "digital divide" remains something of a
mystery. See Sharon Foster & Adrianna Borkowski, Who Coined the Term? Origin
of 'Digital Divide' Escapes Even the Experts, at http://wwwl.soc.american.edu/
students/ij/co_3/digitaldivide/history.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
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any high school education (63.2% vs. 6.8%).2" The disparity in
Internet access was even more prominent: 38.4% of collegeeducated Americans had access, as compared to 9.6% of those with
a high school diploma, and just 1.8% of those without any high
school education.25 °
The existence of this division in content consumers provided
ideal conditions for the development of a copyright evasion system
that could be limited to a sub-group (the technologically savvy).
Peer filesharing networks made that system. By requiring at least a
computer connection and Internet access (and optimally broadband access and open-source know-how), the networks guaranteed
that only a certain percentage of Americans would ever be able to
take full advantage of the defection from the copyright regime.
It is unlikely that the programmers of Napster and other applications actively considered the dynamics of collective action before
writing code. But because filesharing remains confined to a limited
group, filesharers can see that their actions will not eliminate all incentives to create music or seriously impoverish artists. Users of
peer networks are a select group that could and still do live by
slightly different rules.
B. DisorganizedPoliticalAction
Even as a sub-group, however, P2P users remain disorganized.
The second reason that P2P was successful was that, as an avoidance mechanism, it did not require collective action.
That content consumers have not had a strong influence on the
shape of copyright law is well-documented. The lobbying process
that led to the 1976 Copyright Act is a leading example. The Act
was the workproduct of a twenty-one-year-long negotiation between affected industry groups. t Studies suggest, however, that
groups representing consumer interests had little or no influence
on the shape of the 1976 Act. Professor Jessica Litman concluded,
"[T]he citizenry's interest in copyright and copyrighted works was
249See

Nat'l Telecommunications and Info. Admin., Falling Through The Net II:

New Data On The Digital Divide 4 (July 1998).
250
Id.

251 See

Litman, supra note 103, at 48-63 (discussing the negotiations behind the 1976
Act); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
Or. L. Rev. 275, 279-82 (1989) (same).
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too varied and complex to be amenable to interest-group championship."252
These studies show what is obvious: For an average consumer,
lobbying for copyright change is expensive, likely futile, and, even
if successful, an impossible change on which to capitalize. As a result, very few consumers devote themselves to copyright lobbying.
Enter P2P. Individuals who participate in a peer filesharing network immediately capture for themselves the benefits of their investment. They save money on the music they download for free,
with no need to share those savings with others who did not participate. Moreover, the programmers of peer filesharing programs
do not, other than sometimes adhering to a common protocol, even
necessarily need to work together or coordinate their efforts.253
It might be difficult to convince users to contribute, as opposed
to take, from the common pool of shared songs. The process of
sharing, however, has a relatively low cost. Moreover, as Professor
Strahilevitz demonstrates, the design of P2P clients can lead users
to believe that they are participating in a community, triggering
norms of reciprocity."'
One salient question is whether the objective of collective action
moves to writing the peer application itself (the Napster program,
etc.). This shift does not seem to occur. First, provided that the
program can be sold, the programmer can appropriate some of the
value produced by the evasion of copyright law and can avoid the
collective action problem. Second, even if the collective action
problem persists, the investment needed to write a peer networking program may be small enough that the programmer is motivated to write it if for no other reason than just to serve his own
needs. Third, the collaborative structure of open-source software
.2Litman, supra note 103, at 52.
253 The creation of the protocols does represent a collective action problem if they

are open (free for anyone to develop around). Interestingly, the major open peer
filesharing protocol, Gnutella, was produced by an open-source programming effort.
Open-source programming, motivated by technological challenges, has proven its
ability to create public goods. See Peter Kollock, The economies of online cooperation: gifts and public goods in cyberspace, in Communities in Cyberspace 220, 230-35
(Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999) (examining the creation of the Linux operating system as an example of a public good created online despite potential collective action problems).
' See Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 547-71.
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development may play a role in developing responses that rely on
non-monetary incentives. I will examine each explanation in turn.
A program is a private good. If it is sold or otherwise used to
generate returns, its developer has the appropriate incentive to respond on behalf of the group. This incentive is, apparently, what
has driven much of the peer filesharing response so far. For Shawn
Fanning, the founder of Napster, the returns were reputational. As
Time remarked, he "reached a level of fame unprecedented for a
19-year old who is neither a sports hero nor a pop star., 255 But the
financial incentives for writing response programs have not proved
overwhelming.256 Most peer filesharing companies today depend on
the dot-com model of deriving revenue from user traffic. Some developers claim that advertising revenue is enough to stay in business. For example, the developer of WinMX (yet another peer
filesharing application) stated, "We stay in operation by keeping
our costs low .... [W]e think it's smarter to skip the spyware, generate revenue from quality ad exposures on www.winmx.com, and
spend the money on important things such as a small yet
well re257
warded development team, legal contingency funds, etc.,
More seasoned companies, however, question the advertising
model. KaZaA, for example, depends on selling pop-up ads 258 and
plans to harness and sell the unused computing resources of its millions of peered users (derisively referred to as a "spyware" strategy).259 It has freely admitted that the online advertising model
does not deliver enough revenue for it to support continued
development. 60
255Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, Time, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60.
26 See John Borland, Rocky financial road awaits file swappers, CNET

News.com,
at http:news.com.com/2102-1023-273245.html (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing the failure of file swapping programs to
make
257 any money).
WinMX Interview with Kevin Hearn, President, Front Code Technologies, Slyck,
at http://www.slyck.com/newsjuly2002/071002c.html (July 10, 2002) (on file with the

Virginia Law Review Association).
25 See

Erick Schonfeld, The True Cost of Free Music, Business 2.0 (May 24, 2002),
at http://www.business2.com/articles/web/print/0,1650,40816,00.html (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association) (describing KaZaA's business model).
259This

strategy is referred to as "spyware" because it pretends to be performing one

function while actually performing another. Spyware also sometimes refers to programs that collect and store information about the user.
260Id.
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Ironically, this suggests that the continuing development of peer
filesharing may itself depend on copyright law's protection. That is
to say, if other revenue models prove unsuccessful, developers may
have to turn to selling programs or selling membership. 6' Their
ability to do so will depend on copyright protection, either against
unauthorized distribution of the software client (perhaps using a
peer network) or unauthorized circumvention of a copy-protection
scheme. Peer developers may have to enlist copyright processes in
their effort to evade copyright laws. They may then, in a further
twist, find their tools of copyright evasion turned against them.
Alternatively, programming a peer response may be inexpensive
enough that some individuals will always be willing to undertake
the project for their own personal benefit. If a college student
would otherwise spend $500 a year on music, and if his time is not
otherwise valuable, he might consider it a worthwhile investment
to program an improved filesharing application. Similarly, it could
be that the challenge of peer networking development will continue to attract the collaborative attention of open-source developers. How far the open-source movement will take peer filesharing
is an open question-it depends on how interesting the problem
remains to programmers.
As suggested by the change/avoidance dichotomy in Part I, one
of the reasons for the success of P2P as a mechanism of legal influence is that it avoids the collective action problem inherent in
change mechanisms. It has worked because certain members of the
group have appropriate incentives to write programs that then
lower the cost of the copyright system for all computer-savvy users.
This fact explains the mass popularity of P2P among disorganized
consumers. As a result, Napster and other programs have become
an alternative to political lobbying less by choice than by default.

26 For

example, BearShare, at www.bearshare.com, already sells a "professional"
version.
262Opinions on what motivates open-source programmers vary. See, e.g., Kollock,
supra note 253, at 220-39 (describing a gift model); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 First Monday 8, at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html (Aug. 2, 1999) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (arguing that economics cannot explain
why people write free software).
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CONCLUSION

Finding bold predictions for what political programming projects
mean for the future of governance is not difficult to do. John Perry
Barlow's prophecies, for example, have not been understated:
What's happening with global, peer-to-peer networking is not altogether different from what happened when the American
colonists realized they were poorly served by the British Crown:
The colonists were obliged to cast off that power and develop an
economy better suited to their new environment .... No law can
be successfully imposed on a huge population that does not morally support it and possesses easy means for its invisible evasion.263
My own prophecies are somewhat more modest. The ways
groups influence their government and the effects of its laws are
changing. But the effects are ambiguous. At best, the story suggests
that groups that have never fared well in the political process, due
to disorganization or unpopularity, will gain the most. At worst, already-privileged computer users will simply find new ways to freeride.

.63 See John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, Wired 8.10 (Oct. 2000).

